can't find w&i code 11350.7 or .8

I can't find w&i code 11350.7 or .8. Except that it was added in 1998.

Also, where can I find the details of co. of shasta vs smith. In the ca court websites, I either get the basics or 1995 cases are not available.

Any help???

<BLOCKQUOTE><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial">quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by paying big bucks:
[b]I can't find w&i code 11350.7 or .8. Except that it was added in 1998.

Also, where can I find the details of co. of shasta vs smith. In the ca court websites, I either get the basics or 1995 cases are not available.

Any help???[/b]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

My response:

Both code sections are brand new, and the websites for Statutes have not been updated as of yet. You'll have to go to a law library and look at the back, paper insert, of the CA Welfare & Institutions Code to see and copy these new code sections.


County of Shasta v. Smith (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 329, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 52
[No. C019863.Third Dist. Sep 15, 1995.]
COUNTY OF SHASTA et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v.
TWIG GERALD SMITH, Defendant and Appellant.
SUMMARY
The trial court denied an obligor parent's motion to declare that he was not liable for child support payments that were allegedly withheld by his former employer, but not forwarded to the obligee county. The original child support order had been filed pursuant to Welf. & Inst. Code, 11350 and 11350.1 (county's petition for reimbursement of public assistance and establishment of child support). The obligor's former employer had filed bankruptcy proceedings but disappeared without making an appearance. (Superior Court of Shasta County, No. 87716, Gregory M. Caskey, Judge. * )
The Court of Appeal affirmed. The court held that the obligor's former employer, the garnishee, was not an agent of either of the obligees (the obligor's ex-wife or the county). The garnishee's alleged malfeasance was therefore not imputed to either of the obligees, but was simply a matter for resolution between the obligor and his former employer. Thus, the obligor's payments to his former employer did not discharge his debt. The court also held that the motion was properly heard by the trial court even though neither of the obligees had been served with notice, since neither the ex-wife nor the county currently receiving reimbursement payments had been a party to the original child support order.
(Opinion by Davis, J., with Puglia, P. J., and Sims, J., concurring.)
HEADNOTES
(1) Dissolution of Marriage; Separation §106—Permanent Child Support Orders—Assignment of Wages—Motions for Determination of Arrearages.—While an obligor parent may seek to quash a wage-assignment order (Fam. Code, 5270 et seq.), the possibility of a [County of Shasta v. Smith (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 329, page 330]district attorney resorting to alternative means of enforcement has given rise to the practice of motions for the determination of arrearages. In essence, this is some species of declaratory judgment or accounting unconnected with any specific enforcement of the support obligation by the obligee or the district attorney. Even where the obligor parent is seeking by means of the motion to reduce the amount of arrearages claimed, such a motion does not transgress the restriction in Fam. Code, 3651, against modification of accrued support obligations if the obligor can establish a satisfaction or other discharge of the accrued obligation. Accrued arrearages are treated as a money judgment and a court has the inherent authority to determine the amount of a judgment, including any credit to which the judgment debtor is entitled. Even where the existing child support order was made pursuant to Welf. & Inst. Code, 11350 and 11350.1 (county's petition for reimbursement of public assistance and establishment of child support), not the Family Code, this general inherent authority in enforcing judgments is equally applicable.
(2) Dissolution of Marriage; Separation §106—Permanent Child Support Orders—Assignment of Wages—Motions for Determination of Arrearages—Notice Requirement.—An obligor parent's motion to determine arrearages based on a child support order was properly heard by the trial court, even though notice had not been provided to either the obligor's ex-wife or the county currently receiving welfare payment reimbursement, neither of whom was a party in the original child support proceeding. Although such a motion normally implicates Fam. Code, 215, which provides that notice must be served upon the parties, the child support order in this case was obtained by another county pursuant to Welf. & Inst. Code, 11350.1, subd. (a), which explicitly states that the caretaker parent shall not be a necessary party in the action. A child-support order pursuant to the Welfare and Institutions Code is independent of and supersedes any previous support order under the Family Law Act and continues in effect until superseded by a subsequent support order of a family law court. Thus, even if there were a child-support order issued in connection with the obligor's dissolution proceedings (a fact not established by the appellate record), the order to which the obligor's motion related back was a Welfare and Institutions Code child support order to which neither the ex-wife nor the county currently entitled to reimbursement was a party.
(3) Dissolution of Marriage; Separation §106—Permanent Child Support Orders—Assignment of Wages—Joint Liability of Garnishee and Obligor.—Garnishment is a subcategory of attachment where the [County of Shasta v. Smith (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 329, page 331]asset to be attached is in the hands of a third party. It is a wellestablished rule that until a plaintiff collects upon a garnishment, the plaintiff may still seek satisfaction of the judgment against the defendant; the judgment against the defendant is reduced only by the amount actually received by the plaintiff. The judgment against the defendant is separate from, and independent of, that against the garnishees. It is true, both judgments are for the same demand, and if either is satisfied, the plaintiff would not be permitted to enforce the collection of the other. But until one is satisfied, the plaintiff's remedy on each is as ample as though no other judgment had been rendered. Fam. Code, 5241, makes a garnished employer liable to the obligee for failure to forward withheld support and also subjects the employer to contempt. However, there is nothing in this language which limits the obligee to recovering arrearages from the employer. The statute is in accord with the above general principles of garnishment allowing a plaintiff to resort either to the defendant or to the garnishee until the judgment is satisfied. Section 5241 simply imposes the liability without the need for further court action to establish it, and adds contempt as an option for the obligee.
(4) Dissolution of Marriage; Separation §106—Permanent Child Support Orders—Assignment of Wages—Wages Not Forwarded to Obligee: Public Aid and Welfare §26—Aid to Families With Dependent Children—Reimbursement Actions.—The trial court did not err in denying an obligor parent's motion to declare that he was not liable for child support payments that were allegedly withheld by his former employer but not forwarded to the county where his ex-wife had been receiving public assistance for a number of years. The obligor's former employer, the garnishee, was regarded by the law as akin to a trustee, bound to protect the rights of all parties to the assets in the garnishee's possession. The garnishee's alleged malfeasance was therefore not imputed to either of the obligees (the obligor's ex-wife or the county where she was receiving public assistance), but was simply a matter for resolution between the obligor and his former employer. Furthermore, the garnishee was not an agent of his ex-wife or the district attorneys representing the counties seeking reimbursement of welfare payments pursuant to the child support order (Welf. & Inst. Code, 11350.1, subd. (a)). Thus, the obligor's payments to his former employer did not discharge his debt to either his ex-wife or the counties to which he owed reimbursement.[See 11 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1990) Husband and Wife, 241.] [County of Shasta v. Smith (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th