IAAL OR ?:RE,1993 Cal. case People V. Decker

AS IAAL answered on 6-4-00 thread by me(rreichek)a new spouses income cannot be considered in new child support modification
orders.The case i sighted above is what a judge just used to have me, a new spouse, pay my wife's ex-husband's lawyer's fees-in an attempt for visitation modification.Although i am sole support for my wifes two girls(the ex-husband pays ZERO) and although she is a house wife the judge cited "..although she does not work, Mrs.. has the ability to pay because she has community property interest in her husband's seperate property business (we were married last year-the business is 13 years old) to the extent of his time,talent and labor" HOW IS THIS POSSIBLE?
He is now suing HER for support although we have sole phisical custody and i pay ALL bills.Does this "People v.Decker" case (17 Cal.App4th 842, 851) carry into support cases?DID THIS JUDGE MAKE A BIG MISTAKE? Please Answer as i will seek a local attorney next week.THANK YOU

<BLOCKQUOTE><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial">quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by rreichek:
[b]AS IAAL answered on 6-4-00 thread by me(rreichek)a new spouses income cannot be considered in new child support modification
orders.The case i sighted above is what a judge just used to have me, a new spouse, pay my wife's ex-husband's lawyer's fees-in an attempt for visitation modification.Although i am sole support for my wifes two girls(the ex-husband pays ZERO) and although she is a house wife the judge cited "..although she does not work, Mrs.. has the ability to pay because she has community property interest in her husband's seperate property business (we were married last year-the business is 13 years old) to the extent of his time,talent and labor" HOW IS THIS POSSIBLE?
He is now suing HER for support although we have sole phisical custody and i pay ALL bills.Does this "People v.Decker" case (17 Cal.App4th 842, 851) carry into support cases?DID THIS JUDGE MAKE A BIG MISTAKE? Please Answer as i will seek a local attorney next week.THANK YOU [/b]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

My response:

Your cite was incorrect. The proper cite and case name, along with the entire case itself, is reprinted below. The case has NOTHING to do with your fact situation.

In re Marriage of Dekker (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 842, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 642
[No. D012292.Fourth Dist., Div. One. Aug 3, 1993.]
In re the Marriage of DAVID and BARBARA DEKKER. DAVID DEKKER, Respondent, v.
BARBARA DEKKER, Appellant.
SUMMARY
In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the trial court found that the husband's community property claim to stock in a corporation formed by the spouses during the marriage was not barred by judicial estoppel. The court applied an equitable apportionment formula to the stock. It valued the stock at $927,000. It apportioned the wife's initial capitalization of $1,000 plus a 10 percent annual return, totalling $1,934, to her separate property. It apportioned the balance of $925,066 to community property. The court made specific findings that the husband had been paid market value for his services to the corporation, and that he was the reason for the great success of the corporation. (Superior Court of San Diego County, No. D274740, Alan B. Clements, Commissioner, and Linda B. Quinn, Judge.)
The Court of Appeal affirmed. It held that the trial court did not err in finding that the husband was not judicially estopped to assert his community property claim to the stock, even though all the shares were issued in the wife's name and the husband had signed a declaration, in resisting an ex-wife's motion for increased spousal support, denying any ownership interest in the corporation. The wife admitted that she had assisted the husband with his declaration and taken an active role in defeating the ex-wife's motion. Since the purpose of judicial estoppel is to prevent injury to an innocent litigant, the court held that the trial court's finding that the husband was not estopped was supported by substantial evidence. The court further held that the trial court's application of equitable apportionment principles to the increased value of the stock was supported by substantial evidence, even though the husband received a salary during the period of the increase. It held that where more than minimal community effort combines with a separate capital investment to increase the value of the separate investment, the court must determine the amount of the increase attributable to the capital, and the amount attributable to community effort. Finally, the court held, the trial court did not err in choosing to apply the principle of [In re Marriage of Dekker (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 842, page 843]equitable apportionment under which a fair return is allocated to the separate property investment and the balance of the increased value is allocated to community property as arising from community efforts.
(Opinion by Nares, J., with Benke, Acting P. J., and Huffman, J., concurring.)
HEADNOTES
(1) Dissolution of Marriage; Separation §59—Property Rights of Parties—Appeal—Ownership of Corporate Stock—Standard of Review.—Appellate review of a trial court's finding that a particular item is separate or community property is limited to a determination of whether any substantial evidence supports the finding. Thus, in a marital dissolution proceeding, on appeal from the trial court's orders regarding ownership of and interests in a corporation formed by the spouses during the marriage, the substantial evidence test was applicable both to the issue of whether the husband was judicially estopped to assert community interest in the corporation and to the issue of whether equitable apportionment should be applied. The abuse of discretion test was applicable to the trial court's application of the apportionment principle under which a fair return is allocated to the separate property investment and the balance of the increased value to community property as arising from community efforts.
(2) Estoppel and Waiver §16—Estoppel—Trial—Evidence—Marital Dissolution—Husband's Claim to Corporate Stock—Effect of Prior Declaration Disavowing Ownership Interest.—In a marital dissolution proceeding in which the husband claimed a community property interest in a corporation formed by the spouses during the marriage, the trial court did not err in finding that the husband was not judicially estopped to assert such a claim, even though all the shares in the corporation were issued in the wife's name and the husband had signed a declaration, in resisting an ex-wife's motion for increased spousal support, denying any ownership interest in the corporation. Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine aimed at preventing fraud on the courts, and a trial court's determination of this issue is a factual finding [In re Marriage of Dekker (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 842, page 844]that will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. The wife admitted that she had assisted the husband with his declaration and taken an active role in defeating the ex-wife's motion. Since the purpose of judicial estoppel is to prevent injury to an innocent litigant, the trial court's finding that the husband was not estopped was supported by substantial evidence.
(3a, 3b) Dissolution of Marriage; Separation §54—Property Rights of Parties—Additional Award or Offset for Purpose of Restitution—Stock in Corporation Formed by Spouses—Equitable Apportionment.—In a marital dissolution proceeding in which the husband claimed a community property interest in a corporation formed by the spouses during the marriage, the trial court's application of equitable apportionment principles to the increased value of the stock was supported by substantial evidence, even though the husband received a salary during the period of the increase. The wife capitalized the corporation with $1,000 from her separate property. All the stock was issued in her name and was her separate property. She and her husband were the only officers of the corporation. The husband devoted 100 percent of his effort to building the corporation and was primarily responsible for its success. Where more than minimal community effort combines with a separate capital investment to increase the value of the separate investment, the court must determine the amount of the increase attributable to the capital, and the amount attributable to community effort.[Profits from business operating on spouse's separate capital as community or separate property, note, 29 A.L.R.2d 530.]
(4) Dissolution of Marriage; Separation §54—Property Rights of Parties—Additional Award or Offset for Purpose of Restitution—Profits and Increased Value of Separate Property Due to Community Efforts.—The basic concept of community property is that marriage is a partnership in which spouses devote their particular talents, energies, and resources to their common good. Acquisitions and gains that are directly or indirectly attributable to community expenditures of labor and resources are shared equally by the community. Where

[I AM ALWAYS LIABLE]

My further response:

Something has either been unstated by you in your fact situation, or misunderstood by you concerning the actual facts of the litigation and the reasoning of the court. Please read the following insofar as your own privacy rights are concerned, as a third party "new spouse."

A third party does not automatically waive his or her privacy rights in personal financial records simply by living with a parent who owes a duty of child support. Thus, even where the Sec. 4057.5 hurdles can be overcome, discovery of third party financial records in a child support proceeding is ordinarily contingent on the discovery proponent's making a threshold showing the third party income is actually contributed to the parent's living expenses; and the third party is presumptively entitled to a protective order limiting discovery to that material essential to a "fair resolution" of the issue. [Harris v. Super.Ct. (Smets), supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at 667-668, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d at 568-569]

Moreover, where the third party is a "subsequent spouse" or "nonmarital partner," Ca Fam Sec. 4057.5 generally limits discovery for purposes of determining his or her income to W2 and 1099 income tax forms. [Ca Fam Sec. 4057.5(c)]

Discovery issues--relevance and privacy limitations (mandatory threshold showing of income contributions): Since a third party nonparent owes no child support duty and because personal financial information is within the constitutional zone of privacy (Ca Const. Art. I, § 1), a third party's income cannot be made the subject of unrestricted compelled disclosure or access in child support proceedings.

Specifically (apart from new spouse income reported on a joint tax return for purposes of applying the § 4059(a) deduction), third party income is "relevant" in a child support proceeding only to the extent it reduces the obligor parent's basic living expenses, thus increasing his or her "disposable income" available to spend on the children. Consequently, the party seeking compelled disclosure of third party financial information in a child support proceeding must meet the threshold burden of showing the third party actually contributes to the other parent's living expenses. [Harris v. Super.Ct. (Smets), supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at 668, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d at 569--third party's wage statements and tax returns not subject to discovery in child support case on mere showing she rented a room to obligor parent]

No third party financial records discovery to pinpoint contributi ons: To meet the threshold burden, a parent seeking third party financial information should direct initial discovery toward the other parent believed to be the beneficiary of third party income. The third person's financial records are not open to discovery for purposes of determining whether he or she is in fact contributing to the other parent's living expenses. "Depending upon what the discovery of the [other parent] reveals, discovery concerning financial contributions made by a third party to [the other parent's] living expenses may [then] be appropriate." [Harris v. Super.Ct. (Smets), supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at 668, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d at 569 (brackets added)]

Protective order restricting disclosure: Even when the threshold burden is met, the third party is presumptively entitled to a protective order limiting disclosure of the relevant financial information. "The trial court is required to limit the scope of inquiry to the extent necessary to a fair resolution of the case . . . [and] to examine the financial information in chambers and shall exclude from disclosure any information that does not meet this standard." [Harris v. Super.Ct. (Smets), supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at 668, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d at 569 (emphasis and brackets added); see also Bab**** v. Super.Ct. (DiGiovanni) (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 721, 728, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 462, 466 (same where third party financial records sought on other allegedly relevant issues)]

Special discovery limitation re new mate income: In those "extraordinary cases" where the court may properly consider subsequent spouse or nonmarital partner income in the child support calculation, discovery for purposes of determining such income "shall be based on W2 and 1099 income tax forms, except where the court determines that application would be unjust or inappropriate." [Ca Fam Sec.4057.5(c) (emphasis added)]

Compare--no consideration of third party earning capacity: Authority to consider income contributions from a third party does not permit courts to consider the third party's ability to earn (earning capacity) in assessing a parent's "net disposable income" available to pay child support. To hold otherwise would effectively subject the third party to an affirmative obligation to work simply to increase funds available to support children he or she has no statutory duty to support. [Marriage of Williams (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 57, 64, 202 Cal.Rptr. 10, 14-15]

No absolute privacy protection: Information protected by the zone of privacy is not absolutely shielded from discovery. The court may order disclosure to the extent necessary to serve a "compelling public interest." [Britt v. Super.Ct., supra; see Harris v. Super.Ct. (Smets) (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 661, 664, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 567]

As between the spouses, such a "compelling public interest" is rooted in the expressly-codified public policy requiring full and accurate disclosure of assets, liabilities, income and expenses to ensure a proper division of the community estate and "fair and sufficient" child and spousal support awards (Ca Fam Secs.2100, 2120(a)). Clearly, neither spouse in a marital proceeding may rest on a right of privacy objection to resist disclosure of personal financial information. [See Schnabel v. Super.Ct. (Schnabel), supra, 5 Cal.4th at 711, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d at 203]

Balancing test to overcome third party privacy objection: On the other hand, the intraspousal fiduciary duties of disclosure do not ipso facto impede the rights of third parties to financial privacy. [Schnabel v. Super.Ct. (Schnabel), supra, 5 Cal.4th at 711-713, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d at 203-204]

Even though third party financial information may be highly relevant in a marital action (on the issue of property valuation or either spouse's financial status), the court must protect third party privacy rights to the greatest extent possible. Specifically, "when one spouse in a [marital] proceeding seeks discovery from a third party, the court is required to balance the spouse's need for discovery against the third party's privacy interests." [Schnabel v. Super. Ct. (Schnabel), supra, 5 Cal.4th at 714, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d at 205 (emphasis and brackets added)]

Discovery proponent's burden of proof: Following a third party privacy objection, the party seeking discovery has the burden of making a threshold showing that the information (i) is directly relevant to the issues in the case, and (ii) cannot be obtained through any less intrusive means. [Britt v. Super.Ct., supra; see Harris v. Super.Ct. (Smets), supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at 665, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d at 567]

IAAL


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Thank you so much for your wonderful resaerch.I am, however ,overwhelmed with information.you stated i must have left some pertinent information out.While i am sure i have the basic summation of the judges descison was that:

1.my wife,on aide when i met her, is now married to me and my wages are community property.

2.Her ex husband lives on $696 a month and supports his wife and her daughter.

3.He therefore demonstrated "need" and since i have an income, of which my wife is entitled to half-she could afford to pay 1/2 HIS legal fees(in the visitation case)

4.the judge never affirmed my income-HE EXTRAPOLTED from an eariler answer my wife gave him in court,that i " ...grossed about $8000 a month an my construction bussiness".
that i NET $6000 a month so My wife is entitled to $3000 a month

5.The judge cited the Decker case in reaching this conclusion

I am very worried history will repaet itself.while your research is helpful can you tell me, in plain layman's english, how i can defend myself.Our new attorney stated unless i acn prove he is not really disabled ,he stands a good chance for some sort of support order based on that community property precident.PLEASE HELP

This is not an answer to your problem... I am just curious on how your wife's ex. can get support when your wife has sole physical custody??

The answer still iludes me.this decree happened about a month ago and our new attorney is about to try to unravel the mess.while i soley support the children the fact that my wife's ex sees them 20-30% of the time,and he choses to not work,creates a " hardship " for the children while they are with him and this "extreme" circumstance is the only way i think the judge can have us pay him support.However in last months' child visitation case,the fact he could not pay his attorney and my wife was able to because she is now married to me seems to be VERY WRONG.The judge cited the case"People v. Decker"1993 and IAAL states the case is mis-cited as it was a divorce case and it is not relevent i don't know how this can be happening but am looking for help .Any thoughts?