United States Supreme Court Rulings side with employers

[Ohiogal]

What is the name of your state (only U.S. law)? National

I don't normally do employment law but figure some of you who do would like to read these cases:
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SOUTHWESTERN MEDICAL CENTER v. NASSAR
which says:

Held: Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation, not the lessened causation test stated in §2000e–2(m). Pp. 5–23

In other words, the law doesn't matter and doesn't apply because the law is wrong and the causation is much higher.
Here is what the case was about:

Petitioner, a university medical center (University) that is part of theUniversity of Texas system, specializes in medical education. It has an affiliation agreement with Parkland Memorial Hospital (Hospital), which requires the Hospital to offer vacant staff physician posts to University faculty members. Respondent, a physician of Middle Eastern descent who was both a University faculty member and aHospital staff physician, claimed that Dr. Levine, one of his supervisors at the University, was biased against him on account of his religion and ethnic heritage. He complained to Dr. Fitz, Levine’s supervisor. But after he arranged to continue working at the Hospitalwithout also being on the University’s faculty, he resigned his teaching post and sent a letter to Fitz and others, stating that he was leaving because of Levine’s harassment. Fitz, upset at Levine’s public humiliation and wanting public exoneration for her, objected to the Hospital’s job offer, which was then withdrawn. Respondent filedsuit, alleging two discrete Title VII violations. First, he alleged thatLevine’s racially and religiously motivated harassment had resulted in his constructive discharge from the University, in violation of 42
U. S. C. §2000e–2(a), which prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, and national origin” (referred to here as status-based discrimination). Second, he claimed that Fitz’s efforts to prevent the Hospital from hiring him were in retaliation for complaining aboutLevine’s harassment, in violation of §2000e–3(a), which prohibitsemployer retaliation “because [an employee] has opposed . . . an unlawful employment practice . . . or . . . made a [Title VII] charge.” The jury found for respondent on both claims. The Fifth Circuit vacated as to the constructive-discharge claim, but affirmed as to theretaliation finding on the theory that retaliation claims brought under §2000e–3(a)—like §2000e–2(a) status-based claims—require onlya showing that retaliation was a motivating factor for the adverseemployment action, not its but-for cause, see §2000e–2(m). And it found that the evidence supported a finding that Fitz was motivated,at least in part, to retaliate against respondent for his complaintsabout Levine.

Second case is Vance v. Ball State

Under Title VII, an employer’s liability for workplace harassment maydepend on the status of the harasser. If the harassing employee is the victim’s co-worker, the employer is liable only if it was negligentin controlling working conditions. In cases in which the harasser is a “supervisor,” however, different rules apply. If the supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible employment action (i.e., “a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing topromote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, ora decision causing a significant change in benefits,” Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U. S. 742, 761), the employer is strictly liable. But if no tangible employment action is taken, the employer may escape liability by establishing, as an affirmative defense, that
(1) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any harassing behavior and (2) that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities that theemployer provided. Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U. S. 775, 807; Ellerth, supra, at 765.
Petitioner Vance, an African-American woman, sued her employer, Ball State University (BSU) alleging that a fellow employee, Saundra Davis, created a racially hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. The District Court granted summary judgment to BSU. It held that BSU was not vicariously liable for Davis’ alleged actions because Davis, who could not take tangible employment actions against Vance, was not a supervisor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Held: An employee is a “supervisor” for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII only if he or she is empowered by the employer totake tangible employment actions against the victim. Pp. 9–30.

The definition of supervisor has been delineated in favor of the employer.