II. The Rolls Royce.
The document purporting to evidence the transmutation of the Rolls Royce in this case is a computer printout entitled "DMV Vehicle Registration Information," which reflects that, as of October 5, 1995, the vehicle, which had been previously registered in Everett's name alone, was reregistered in the names of Everett or Evelyn. No signature of any party appears on the document. As with the real property, Dozier contends that the DMV printout does not satisfy the "express declaration" requirement of Family Code section 852, subdivision (a), because it does not contain language "expressly stat[ing] that the characterization or ownership of the property [was] being changed." (MacDonald, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 272, 272 Cal.Rptr. 153, 794 P.2d 911.) Evelyn responds that, because title to the automobile was held in joint tenancy, it is excluded from probate under Probate Code section 6600, subdivision (b)(1). Evelyn further argues that the transfer of title on the Rolls Royce is exempt from the requirements of section 852, subdivision (a), because the property was "commingled or otherwise combined" with marital property, as described in subdivision (d) of the subject statute.
Vehicle Code sections 4150.5 and 5600.5 effectively create a presumption that a vehicle "registered in the names of two (or more) persons as coowners in the alternative by use of the word `or'" is held in joint tenancy. However, the Supreme Court's "interpretation of the `express declaration' language in section 852, subdivision (a), can [also] be viewed as effectively creating a `presumption' that transactions between spouses are not `transmutations,' rebuttable by evidence the transaction was documented with a writing containing the requisite language." (Barneson, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 593, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 726.) The court in Barneson addressed the conflict in the presumptions created by Family Code section 852, subdivision (a), and Evidence Code section 662, which provides that "[t]he owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title." Barneson held that, because the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 852, subdivision (a), was based in part on a policy of "`assuring that a spouse's community property entitlements 421*421 are not improperly undermined,'" the general presumption under Evidence Code section 662 should not be used to negate the more specific requirements of section 852, subdivision (a). (Barneson, supra, at p. 593, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 726; see MacDonald, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 268-272, 272 Cal.Rptr. 153, 794 P.2d 911.) Following the principle enunciated in Barneson, the more general form of title presumption created by Vehicle Code sections 4150.5 and 5600.5 should not be used to negate the requirements of section 852, subdivision (a), which assure that a spouse's separate property entitlements are not undermined. (MacDonald supra, at pp. 268-272, 272 Cal.Rptr. 153, 794 P.2d 911; see also In re Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 277, 301-302, 39 Cal. Rptr.2d 673 [in case of conflict, the more specific presumption of undue influence in transactions between married persons under Fam. Code section 721 prevails over the more general presumption of ownership from title under Evidence Code section 662].)
Although the DMV printout may comply with the requirements for a presumption of joint tenancy under Vehicle Code sections 4150.5 and 5600.5, there is nothing on the face of the document evidencing that the change in the form of title was "made, joined in, consented to, or accepted by" Everett, the spouse whose interest in the property was adversely affected. (Fam. Code § 852, subd. (a).) Moreover, the document does not contain a clear and unambiguous expression of Everett's intent to transfer his interest in the subject property, as required by section 852, subdivision (a). (MacDonald supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 271-273, 272 Cal.Rptr. 153, 794 P.2d 911; see Estate of Petersen (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1742, 1754-1755, 34 Cal. Rptr.2d 449 [designation of joint tenancy on account statement does not satisfy the requirement of an express written declaration pursuant to section 852, subd. (a) ].) Thus, the Rolls Royce was not validly transmuted from Everett's separate property.
We are unpersuaded by Evelyn's argument that the Rolls Royce is exempt from the requirements of section 852, subdivision (a). Subdivision (d) of section 852 provides that "[n]othing in this section affects the law governing characterization of property in which separate property and community property are commingled or otherwise combined." As discussed above, application of section 852, subdivision (a), dictates that the Rolls Royce, which was owned separately by Everett prior to his marriage to Evelyn, maintain its character as Everett's separate property. In arguing that the Rolls Royce was somehow commingled or otherwise combined with marital property, Evelyn fails to cite any law governing the characterization of commingled or combined property, under which the vehicle should be characterized as something other than Everett's separate property. Since Evelyn fails to cite any law that conflicts with section 852, subdivision (a), there is no basis to conclude that the statute is inapplicable. (See Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699-700, 46 Cal. Rptr.2d 119 ["When an issue is unsupported by pertinent or cognizable legal argument it may be deemed abandoned and discussion by the reviewing court is unnecessary"].)
In short, because the Rolls Royce was not validly transmuted under section 852, subdivision (a), it remained Everett's separate property. Thus, the trial court erred in excluding it from the probate estate.
