Brinson v. State, 278 So.2d 1973 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973):
Any forcible penetration by a man’s sexual organ into any bodily orifice of another against the latter’s will constitutes forcible carnal knowledge of the victim.
This very interesting case recognizes that “carnal knowledge statutes have generally been held to connote forcible penetration of the sexual organ of the victim,” but notes that there is nothing in the language of the statute to require such a restricted interpretation.
The court reasoned that the restricted interpretation was based upon the fact that there was a crime against nature statute which covered other such sexual acts. Once the crimes against nature statute was ruled unconstitutional, the court felt that acts such as sodomy and oral sex should be covered by carnal knowledge. Please note that this case was overruled in Brinson v. State, 288 So.2d 480 (Fla. 1974) on other grounds.
In addition to modifying the interpretation of “carnal knowledge” the District Court also ruled that the statue would apply to male victims even though the statute specified it only applied to female victims. This was usurping a legislative function. The District Court’s definition of “carnal knowledge” was specifically approved by the Florida Supreme Court in Washington v. State, 302 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1974).
Perez v. State, 545 So.2d 1357 (Fla. 1989):
Limitations period in effect at time of incident giving rise to criminal charges controls time within which prosecution must begin; therefore, defendant's prosecution for sexual battery was not time barred inasmuch as, at time of alleged offenses, death was possible penalty and no limitations period was applicable. A very good case for general knowledge in this area.
McGahee v. State, 561 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990):
Defendant was improperly convicted of rape for forcing child to commit oral sodomy upon him; rape statute in effect at the time of offense (1/1/71 to 10/1/72) was not interpreted to prohibit unlawful sexual acts other than penetration of female victim's sex organ by male's sex organ and , thus, trial court's definition of rape in its jury instruction, which included act perpetrated by defendant, violated ex post facto clause. This is an excellent case to follow the history of the sex laws.
This case points out a very subtle distinction in this legal area. Prior to December 17, 1971, sexual acts which did not involve the penis penetrating the vagina were punishable as crimes against nature, F.S. 800.01. When that statute was ruled unconstitutional on December 17, 1971, the only viable charge for such crimes as forcible sodomy and oral sex was a second degree misdemeanor under F.S. 800.02.
The Brinson court expressed outrage at the pending status of the law and decided that they would redefine the term “carnal knowledge” to include those acts previously covered by the unconstitutional statute. The McGahee decision points out that the courts new definition only applies to offenses which occurred after the May 17, 1973 release date of the Brinson decision. Consequently, oral and anal sex only apply to the carnal knowledge statute for seventeen months. This covers the time period between the Brinson decision and the October 1, 1974 Sexual Battery statute.
Now, after all of that discussion we come back to the poster. Since the crime occurred in 1989, the following statute is relevant:
794.011(2): Sexual Battery: A person 18 years of age or older who commits sexual battery upon, or injures the sexual organs of, a person less than 12 years of age in an attempt to commit sexual battery upon such person commits a capital felony punishable as provided in 775.082 and 921.141. If the offender is under the age of 18, that person is guilty of a life felony, punishable as provided in 775.082, 775.083 or 775.084.
This statute simply changes the wording "over the age of 11 years" to 12 years of age or older." They both mean the same thing, but the revision is intended to be a clearer expression of legislative intent.
Which brings us to the following:
Prior to July 1, 1975, the statute of limitations was contained in F.S. 932.465. Under that statute, "a prosecution for an offense punishable by death may be commenced at any time." All others had a two year statue of limitations. On July 1, 1975, the statute of limitations was reclassified as F.S. 775.15. Under this statute "A prosecution for a capital felony may be commenced at any time." The current law states that a prosecution for a capital or life felony may be commenced at any time.
The death penalty was eliminated as a possible penalty as a result of the case of Buford v. State, 403 So.2d 943 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982). From July 24, 1972 until October 1, 1972, there was a two year statute of limitations. See Mercer v. State, 654 So.2d 1221 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) in my Issues of Time chapter.
So, after reading the legal history of the statutes in Florida, what do you think will or can happen?
When I was 15 I would have given a tooth to be taken advantage of by an older woman "who was of no blood relation".