Hertebise v Reliable Business Computers, Inc. 452 Mich 405 (1996)
The employer had argued that the Plaintiff was bound by an arbitration agreement contained in an employee handbook. This particular handbook also contained a provision providing that the employee was an "at will" employee.
The Michigan Supreme Court ruled that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable against an at will employee.
In Toussaint v. Blue Cross, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980), the Michigan Supreme Court decided a case involving alleged employment contracts. In the Toussaint decision and its progeny, the courts held that the existence of an employment at will relationship can be rebutted by statements in employee manuals, personnel manuals, performance reviews, disciplinary rules and conceivably even by oral representations.
In a case arising shortly after the Toussaint decision, Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 495 F.Supp. 344 (E.D.MI 1980) the following language was held to conclusively rebut the existence of a contract for a specified term:
I certify that the information contained in this application is correct to the best of my knowledge and understand that falsification of this information is grounds for dismissal in accordance with Sears, Roebuck and Co. Policy. I authorize the references listed above to give you any and all information concerning my previous employment and any pertinent information they may have, personal or otherwise, and release all parties from all liability for any damage that may result from furnishing same to you. In consideration of my employment, I agree to conform to the rules and regulations of Sears, Roebuck and Co., and my employment and compensation can be terminated with or without cause, and with or without notice, at any time, at the option of either the Company or myself. I understand that no store manager or representative of Sears, Roebuck and Co., other than the president or vice-president of the Company, has any authority to enter into any agreement for employment for any specified period of time, or to make any agreement contrary to the foregoing.
That language was the basis on which the employer won summary judgments in virtually dozens of alleged employment contract cases following Novosel. As the Court said in Reid v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 790 F.2d 453, 461 (6th Cir. 1986)
"Every reported district court case involving a claim of unlawful discharge in the face of the language contained in the Sears’ application has resulted in summary judgments for Sears."
Furthermore, Michigan courts have held that whether disclaimers are enforceable can be a question of fact where factors reflecting a contrary intention exist.
In Dalton v. Herbruck Egg Sales, Co., plaintiff admitted reading and understanding a disclaimer in his handbook that he could be terminated "at any time ... without specific cause or reason." Yet the handbook also contained a progressive discipline policy. The Court of Appeals found that the tenor of the entire handbook was that all employees would be treated fairly and justly in accordance with the procedures set forth therein, and thus a jurycould decide to disregard the disclaimer. In Schipani v. Ford Motor Co. the Court of Appeals held that an employer's oral representations regarding duration of employment could override an express disclaimer in written materials.
The 'reasonable notice' doctrine employed in California is also the Michigan standard.
In Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co., the Michigan Supreme Court reaffirmed that a written "discharge for cause" provision could be revised by a later writing, provided the employee was given "reasonable notice". But in a companion case, Bullock v. Automobile Club Insurance Association of Michigan the Court indicated that implied contracts, once created, may create a legitimate expectation which subsequent employer policy changes cannot simply reverse.
In Bullock, the plaintiff claimed an oral promise of discharge for cause only. The defendant subsequently issued a policy manual indicating employment-at-will. The Court indicated that in the right factual circumstances of "reasonable expectation", the subsequent change could be considered only an offer of a contract change, permitting a jury to conclude that the previous implied contract was still enforceable.
Whether the policy was an alteration of the existing policy or the employee had 'notice' before accepting the terms of the employment, are a matter of fact for a court. However, the 'Reasonable Notice' standard does NOT apply absent an alteration of the Handbook / policy. If there are no alterations, there can be no reasonable notice expectation.
Even the Michigan courts have set limits on their new doctrine. In Schwartz v. Michigan Sugar Co., and subsequent cases, the courts have insisted that "a more subjective expectancy on the part of employee" is insufficient to create the "legitimate expectation" necessary to form an enforceable contract.
Actual conduct by the parties, oral statements, or written materials are at least necessary to form an implied contract. In addition, the more conservative federal courts (especially the Sixth Circuit) have engaged in guerilla warfare against the Toussaint doctrine, taking every opportunity within the guidelines established by the Michigan Supreme Court to limit the impact of the implied contract approach to the employment relationship.
The Employee manual you prooffered here includes TWO such disclaimers. First, the 'at-will' language of Toussaint and second, the specific language of 'non-contract' in the Reid decision. Furthermore, in your post there is no indication that the Handbook has undergone an alteration sufficient to invoke the 'reasonable notice' requirement.