Simply stated: Intentional torts are, supposedly, not dischargable. However, the 'injured party' has to file an objection, and the Bk Judge will decide.
Recent BK cases appear to have focused on the 'malicious' element (rather than simply intentional), and has examined whether the perp intended and could foresee the damage inflicted.
When you think about it, why should an intentional (malicious) tortfeasor get a 'fresh start' ?
Quincey is right.
from finklelaw.com:
Section 523(a)(6)
A. Section 523(a)(6) Explained
As mentioned above, Section 523(a)(6) exempts from discharge all debts "for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity."7 Broken down into its component elements, Section 523(a)(6) focuses on three significant points: the act subject of the discharge must be willful; the act must be malicious; and the act must be intended to result in an injury. The injury element is the most straightforward and most broad element of the three,8 resulting in little need for judicial interpretation. It includes physical injury in tort as well as conversion of property.9 However, the application of the willful and malicious component in Section 523 (a)(6) is not so straightforward and thus frequently subject to the scrutiny of the bankruptcy court, who acts as both judge and jury throughout the process.
Part of the difficulty in interpreting "willful" and "malicious" in bankruptcy is that these elements are not defined within the Code, and, as terms of art, are treated as separate elements to be proven.10 Read alone, "willful" is generally taken to mean the same as "deliberate or intentional," which requires something more than "mere recklessness."11 The standard for willful is whether the act was undertaken voluntarily.12 In contrast, the "malicious" standard requires more than willfulness but falls short of requiring personal animosity, spite, or ill will.13 Although the three elements appear to be straightforward and easily understood, this is not the case, particularly when the willful and malicious elements are applied together. Until recently, bankruptcy courts have traditionally been able to rely on tort litigation interpretations of "willful and malicious," thereby creating an effective marriage of two otherwise separate legal disciplines.
B. Intentional Torts
Although the concepts inherent in tort law lack precise definition as well,14 the concept of intent, or lack thereof, undoubtedly forms the backbone of this area of law.15 Accordingly, the concept of a tort involves action or inaction by one individual against another. This is particularly true of the concept of intentional torts, which is defined in part as a "[t]ort or wrong perpetuated by one who intends to do that which the law has declared wrong."16 The term "intentional torts" implies an intent or purpose to injure, and involves both elements of purpose (intent) and malice.17 Notice that in tort, malice does not have to be purposeful - malice can be shown by "indifference to the safety of others, with knowledge of their danger, or failure to use ordinary care to avoid injury after acquiring such knowledge."18 Further, whether a negligent act amounts to a willful and malicious injury is a question of fact for trial,19 is then decided by the jury according to the "reasonable person" standard.
A thorough exploration into the requirements needed to prove an intentional tort is not complete without studying negligence theory, which continually evolves closer to intentional tort theory in holding a wrongdoer liable for injuries caused by their own behavior. Negligence is a legal mechanism often used when either the wrongdoer's behavior does not constitute an intentional act, or when the petitioner is incapable of meeting the burden of proof for an intentional tort. Negligence is often viewed as a product of intentional torts, separated only by the difference in the probability of whether or not the act of the wrongdoer will cause injury to others.
C. The Dilemma of Section 523(a)(6)
The Bankruptcy courts, however, act as judge and jury when evaluating actions for bankruptcy, including whether an exception to discharge operates to preclude a fresh start. Because lack of a jury requires the bench employ a substantial certainty test, thereby requiring a decision in accordance with the reasonable person standard, bankruptcy courts have continually been split in their pursuit to find a standard defining "willful and malicious" as required in Section 523 (a)(6). One source for the lack of a precedent, and subsequently a split in interpretations, is that until recently, there have been only guideposts at law for interpreting Section 523 (a)(6). As previously stated, the split has occurred in interpreting the combination of "willful and malicious" as provided in Section 523 (a)(6).26 This disagreement over interpretation of the "willful and malicious" standard traveled one of two paths: either "willful and malicious" was interpreted in the narrow sense which requires an actual intent to cause the actual injury;27 or, in the alternative, "willful and malicious" was given broader connotations as used in tort cases, and requires merely the intent to do the act that led to the subsequent injury.28
However, this division has apparently been resolved by the recent decision by the United States Supreme Court in Kawaauhau v. Geiger.29 In their resolve, the Supreme Court, for purposes of evaluating intentional tort claims for discharge in bankruptcy,30 effectively endorsed the narrow interpretation, which requires an injured party to present evidence proving the alleged tortfeasor intended to cause the resulting injury. Simply stated, the Geiger court has severed the marriage between bankruptcy law and tort law in determining whether or not 523(a)(6) should be employed to except from discharge the debtor's wrongful acts.
Consequently, in defining the "willful and malicious" requirement in Section 523(a)(6), the Supreme Court has potentially eroded the standard for evaluating the "willful" prong in intentional tort litigation, which traditionally has relied on the alternative path not followed by the Supreme Court. Intentional tort law has traditionally required only a showing the wrongdoer intended to undertake the act which caused the injury31.
On March 3, 1998, the Supreme Court affirmed this narrow interpretation by the Eighth Circuit in an unanimous opinion:
Because a debt arising from a medical malpractice judgment attributable to negligent or reckless conduct does not fall within the section 523(a)(6) exception, the debt is dischargeable in bankruptcy. Section 523(a)(6)'s words strongly support the Eighth Circuit's reading that only acts done with the actual intent to cause injury fall within the exception's scope. The section's word "willful" modifies the word "injury," indicating that the nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely . . . a deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury.41
In reaching this holding, the Court has abandoned previous interpretations of intentional tort law while noting that "ntentional torts generally require that the actor intend the consequence of the an act, not simply the act itself42." Simply stated, the Supreme Court has increased the burden of proof for a petitioner alleging an intentional tort. The petitioner must now prove the alleged tortfeasor intended the result of their actions; a tortfeasor can only be held liable for the damages they could substantially foresee, thereby constituting their intended result.
OP, if your act was malicious, it is likely the Judge will not allow damages to be discharged in Bk.
If your act was negligent, or reckless, you have a much better chance of discharge.
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