First of all, it's KCM, not KVM.
KCM FINANCIAL LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 SW 3d 70 - Tex: Supreme Court 2015 - Google Scholar
Second, despite your cautionary warning about paraphrasing, the only thing in the KCM decision that is remotely close to what you wrote is:
"The Act is designed to protect creditors from being defrauded or left without recourse due to the actions of unscrupulous debtors" and "The purpose of TUFTA is to prevent debtors from defrauding creditors by placing assets beyond their reach."
The second sentence was cited from
Corpus v. Arriaga, 294 S.W.3d 629, 634 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2009
There is nothing in KCM about "value" other than a debtor "is prohibited from transferring its assets for less than reasonably equivalent value if it is insolvent or would become insolvent by virtue of the transfer.
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And that's a quote from the statute.
It's interesting to note that Bradshaw's claim (in the KCM decision) of "fraudulent transfer" failed.
I looked for a more concise definition of "reasonably equivalent value" and found it in Janvey v. Golf Channel, Inc., 487 SW 3d 560 - Tex: Supreme Court 2016
Janvey v. Golf Channel, Inc., 487 SW 3d 560 - Tex: Supreme Court 2016 - Google Scholar
"On rehearing, the Circuit vacated its opinion. Observing that TUFTA, unlike the model Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), specially defines the term "reasonably equivalent value" to include consideration having value from a marketplace perspective, the Circuit certified the following question to this Court (The Texas Supreme Court):
Considering the definition of "value" in section 24.004(a) of [TUFTA], the definition of "reasonably equivalent value" in section 24.004(d) of [TUFTA], and the comment in [UFTA] stating that "value" is measured "from a creditor's viewpoint," what showing of "value" under TUFTA is sufficient for a transferee to prove the elements of the [good-faith] affirmative defense under section 24.009(a) of [TUFTA]?"
Construing the relevant statutory provisions, we conclude TUFTA's "reasonably equivalent value" requirement can be satisfied with evidence that the transferee (1) fully performed under a lawful, arm's-length contract for fair market value, (2) provided consideration that had objective value at the time of the transaction, and (3) made the exchange in the ordinary course of the transferee's business."
That's a little better but doesn't really help with Mayojones' case.
I soldiered on and found Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Carter, 371 SW 3d 366 - Tex: Court of Appeals 2012
Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Carter, 371 SW 3d 366 - Tex: Court of Appeals 2012 - Google Scholar
"A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or within a reasonable time after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation ... with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor." TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005(a)(1)"
The court goes on to explain how intent to defraud may be show. I'll comment on each element.
"The actual intent to defraud is shown by, among other things, evidence that the transfer was made to an insider, including a relative"
That element does appear to apply since a relative was the recipient of the debtor's largesse.
"the debtor retained possession or control of the transferred property after the transfer;"
Nope, she didn't. The tickets were used and the trip taken. She had no control over whether the relative would actually use the tickets or turn them in for cash and keep the cash.
"the transfer or obligation was concealed;"
Hmm. Don't know. How and when did Mayojones find out about the tickets?
"the debtor was sued or threatened with suit before the transfer was made or the obligation incurred;"
Yep, looks like we have that.
"the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred;"
I don't see where the debtor received any consideration at all. The tickets were apparently a gift.
"the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or obligation incurred;"
I don't think so. If I remember correctly, it was the husband that was unemployed, not the debtor. Insolvency is basically debts exceed assets. That some assets are untouchable under Texas law does not mean that the debtor was insolvent.
"the transfer occurred shortly before or after a substantial debt was incurred;"
I don't think we know when the tickets were purchased in relation to the date of the judgment.
The decision includes further analysis which can be read by anyone interested.
Frankly, I'm not convinced that the debtor engaged in a fraudulent transfer. She could have easily bought the tickets on an active credit card and is paying it off out of her wages (which are untouchable under Texas law). Nothing wrong with that. What's the difference between that and an online debit from her account for the full amount?
Mayojones had opportunities to levy the debtor's bank account and hasn't explained why that didn't happen.