• FreeAdvice has a new Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, effective May 25, 2018.
    By continuing to use this site, you are consenting to our Terms of Service and use of cookies.

Moon Valley Nursery Slandered & Harassed By Ex Employee

Accident - Bankruptcy - Criminal Law / DUI - Business - Consumer - Employment - Family - Immigration - Real Estate - Tax - Traffic - Wills   Please click a topic or scroll down for more.

mpav

Junior Member
Arizona
I work for Moon Valley Nursery Inc., an AZ based company. We have an ex employee, who, over the past year has posted all sorts of untruths about Moon Valley Nursery Inc. all over the internet. These untruths regard our hiring and employment practices; stating that we practice slave labor and don't abide by state and/or federal hiring regulations. We are and have been in compliance with state and federal hiring / pay regulations since before this individual even worked for us. We even have an in house medical clinic that is free to all employees. We take a lot of extra steps to take care of our employees. Bottom line...this individual knowingly continues to slander and spread untruthful statements about Moon Valley Nursery and I would like to know what can be done legally to put an end to this. Anyone who has experienced a similiar situation, your advice is greatly appreciated.
Thanks in advance, mpav
 
Last edited:


S

seniorjudge

Guest
mpav said:
Arizona
I work for Moon Valley Nursery Inc., an AZ based company. We have an ex employee, who, over the past year has posted all sorts of untruths about Moon Valley Nursery Inc. all over the internet. These untruths regard our hiring and employment practices; stating that we practice slave labor and don't abide by state and/or federal hiring regulations. We are and have been in compliance with state and federal hiring / pay regulations since before this individual even worked for us. We even have an in house medical clinic that is free to all employees. We take a lot of extra steps to take care of our employees. Bottom line...this individual knowingly continues to slander and spread untruthful statements about Moon Valley Nursery and I would like to know what can be done legally to put an end to this. Anyone who has experienced a similiar situation, your advice is greatly appreciated.
Thanks in advance, mpav
Did you have a legal question?
 

mpav

Junior Member
I guess the legal question is (forgive me, I'm not a lawyer) Can anything be done in state or federal court to make him stop or retract statements. Or is this an issue for civil court.
 
S

seniorjudge

Guest
mpav said:
I guess the legal question is (forgive me, I'm not a lawyer) Can anything be done in state or federal court to make him stop or retract statements. Or is this an issue for civil court.
State and federal courts are civil and I have no idea how to make people stop talking bad about other people.

If I did, I would use that magic bullet on some people I know....
 

cbg

I'm a Northern Girl
This is a question, not a rebuttal.

What damages have you suffered that you can PROVE due to these statements?
 
M

meganproser

Guest
False statements of fact that accuse another of unscrupulous business practices and/or committing a crime qualify as defamation per se. Damages are presumed.

A similar situation is found on line in the complaint of another Arizona business:

http://www.yp.com/StocklemonLawsuit.doc.
 
Last edited:

Shay-Pari'e

Senior Member
cbg said:
This is a question, not a rebuttal.

What damages have you suffered that you can PROVE due to these statements?
Good question, because damage is NOT presumed. It needs to be proven.
 
Last edited:
M

meganproser

Guest
The link on my last post did not copy right and for some reason I can't edit the post now. Here is the full link from that case:

http://www.yp.com/StocklemonLawsuit.doc.

In response to Paradise's comment that damages are not presumed:

The following excerpts are taken from Schmitz v. Aston, 197 Ariz. 264, 3 P.3d 1184 (Ariz.App. Div. 2000):

if the defamatory statement is actionable per se, injury is presumed and the plaintiff does not have to meet the burden of proving special harm in order to recover nominal or compensatory damages. See Modla v. Parker, 17 Ariz. App. 54, 56, 495 P.2d 494, 496 (1972); see also W. Page Keeton et al., supra, § 112, at 788. An oral statement is defamatory per se if it imputes the commission of crimes involving moral turpitude. See Hansen v. Stoll, 130 Ariz. 454, 457, 636 P.2d 1236, 1239 (App. 1981); Roscoe, 105 Ariz. at 312, 464 P.2d at 335; see also Restatement § 571(b).

53 The statements here were defamatory per se. Cf. Miles v. National Enquirer, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1229 (D. Colo 1999) (holding statements that plaintiff was a pedophile and sexual offender are defamatory per se). Thus, damages were presumed. See Hirsch v. Cooper, 153 Ariz. 454, 457, 737 P.2d 1092, 1095 (App. 1986). "Presumed damages may be awarded by juries with very little guidance as to their amount." 1 Robert D. Sack, Sack on Defamation § 10.3.3 (3d ed. 1999).

Although evidence supports the trial court's finding that the Astons did not suffer significant harm to their reputations, *fn9 such a finding is irrelevant in a defamation per se case. Thus, we hold that the court erred in vacating the award for general or reputational damages on the defamation claim. We so hold because damages for defamation per se are presumed, and the jury is permitted to award a reasonable sum for the presumed harm suffered. We conclude that the jury award of $100,000 was reasonable. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court with directions to reinstate the jury's award of general damages for defamation.
 
Last edited:

Shay-Pari'e

Senior Member
LSU Law Center's
Medical and Public Health Law Site
Privacy/Public Health Reporting and Testing
Does the Conditional Privilege for Public Health and Safety Reporting Extend to Reports to Neighbors? - Schmitz v. Aston, 197 Ariz. 264, 3 P.3d 1184 (Ariz.App. Div. 2000)
Rehearing Denied, case designated not-report, Schmitz v. Aston, 199 Ariz. 431, 18 P.3d 1230 (Ariz. 2001)

This is an interesting case. Simplifying a complex set of facts, defendants believed that their 5 year old daughter had been sexually molested by plaintiff. A pediatric exam could not rule out abuse so the physician reported the case to child protective services. A police investigation disclosed no evidence of abuse, but this did not satisfy the defendant parents. They sought psychiatric care for their daughter, telling the provider that she had been molested. After months of therapy, the child still did not admit to molestation, but did say that the plaintiff might have touched her buttocks once or twice while baby-sitting her and his own daughter. This was reported to the police, who again found no basis to charge the plaintiff with molestation. Dissatisfied, defendants began telling their neighbors with children that plaintiff was a child molester. Neighborhood tensions escalated and resulted in this lawsuit. Plaintiff sued for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress and received a jury award of nearly $2,000,000, including punitive and emotional damages. The trial judge reduced the damages to approximately $500,000 and the defendants appealed.

Defendants' core claim is that the case should never have been submitted to the jury because the trial court found that they had a conditional privilege to warn, and that such a privilege could only be overcome if plaintiffs proved that they acted with actual malice. This conditional privilege argument only applied to reports to the neighbors. It is clear that reports to the police by the defendant parents were privileged unless it can be proven they were in bad faith. The reports by the health care providers to Child Protective Services were likewise privileged and could not form a basis for a tort claim. The appeals court analyzed this claim of conditional privilege in detail, finding it an important question of first impression nationally, with only one other case addressing a related issue in another jurisdiction.

The trial court's conditional privilege was based on a policy argument, without specific legal authority: The court stated that "publication to neighbors of one's good faith suspicions 'there is someone in the neighborhood that may have molested their children' ... is of grave, social importance." On appeal, the defendants argued "...that three factors justify a grant of a conditional privilege in this case: (1) protection of the interest of the recipient or third person; (2) common interest; and (3) public policy." In looking for legal guidance, the appeals court turned to Restatement of Torts sec. 595: for its standard on when a publication is conditionally privileged, "...[if] there is information that affects a sufficiently important interest of the recipient or third person" and the publisher is under a legal duty to publish the defamatory matter, or publication to the recipient "is otherwise within the generally accepted standards of decent conduct." Since the law only required this information to be reported to the police, the court had to determine whether telling the neighbors fell with the ambiguous standards of decent conduct. The court recognized that this conditional privilege has been applied to situations such as previous employers warning new employers about dangerous employees, reports by private investigators to employers, and several other situations where either a request was made for the information or there was a familial relationship between the persons sharing the information. In this case, there was no evidence that the neighbors asked about whether the plaintiff was a child molester, rather, it was clear that the defendants volunteered this information. The court was also unwilling to accept that being in the neighborhood constituted a legal relationship that would support a conditional privilege.

Defendants' final argument is that such private notification is good public policy and was endorsed by Arizona's legislature when it passed Arizona's version of Megan's law requiring community notification of sex offenders in the area, as well as creating an Internet Sex Offender web site. While the court recognizes that Arizona does favor community notification of the whereabouts of sex offenders, it distinguishes these statutes on two grounds. First, they control who can disseminate the information and the form of dissemination. Second, and most important, they are predicated on a criminal conviction for a sex offense. With no conviction, or even sufficient evidence to indict plaintiff, the court found that plaintiff's right in his reputation outweighed any community benefit. They reiterated that the defendants had access to the police and that the police had investigated the case. The court was not willing to let the defendants second guess the police with their private notification system. Thus the appeals court rejected the trial court's finding of conditional privilege, and with it, defendants' claims that plaintiff had not established that defendants acted with actual malice. The court did agree that the damages were excessive, in that they greatly exceeded defendants' net worth and ability to pay. The case was remanded with instructions to the district court on remittitur.

This is an important case of first impression on the right of non-government employees to warn third parties about potentially dangerous individuals. The case has a good discussion of the defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims that can arise from such warnings, as well as useful authority on conditional immunity as applied to legally mandated health and safety reports in the absence of specific state statutes creating immunity for legally mandated reports.



And this has to do with the poster?
 
M

meganproser

Guest
It has to do with your incorrect statement that damages are NOT presumed. You wrote above:

Good question, because damage is NOT presumed. It needs to be proven.

I didn't feel like looking up the Arizona Statute.

It took me less time to grab this case, which includes a discussion of damages in defamation per se along with numerous citations in support of the appellate court's statement: “if the defamatory statement is actionable per se, injury is presumed”

I was PROVING to you, for about the tenth time, that damages are presumed in cases of defamation per se.
 
Last edited:

Shay-Pari'e

Senior Member
I didn't feel like looking up the Arizona Statute. I see, that would have been to easy. So you googled a case that has nothing to do with the posters question? Now would be the time to find that statute, or shut up for once in your life.

It took me less time to grab this case, which includes a discussion of damages in defamation per se along with numerous citations in support of the appellate court's statement: “if the defamatory statement is actionable per se, injury is presumed” The statute Pro'se'r? That is easier than looking up cases that do not pertain to the poster. What is the statute?


I was PROVING to you, for about the tenth time, that damages are presumed in cases of defamation per se.

YOU were proving nothing to me, especially 10 times. I remember other people on this thread, not just myself. Are you trying to prove me wrong, or the other posters as well?

Practice what you preach. I never know what personality I am responding to.
 
M

meganproser

Guest
I didn't feel like looking up the Arizona Statute. I see, that would have been to easy.

It would have? I need the annotated statutes and as far as I know I’d have to get them from Westlaw. Seems easier to me to pull up some case law by doing just what I did.

So you googled a case that has nothing to do with the posters question?

That is correct. Note the discussion of damages and the various citations of case law that support the FACT that damages are PRESUMED in defamation per se.

Now would be the time to find that statute, or shut up for once in your life.


Calm down, you’re scaring me. The Statute itself won’t answer the question of presumed damages. I could look up the annotations but all they would do is direct me to the case law that I already found and gave you!

I was PROVING to you, for about the tenth time, that damages are presumed in cases of defamation per se.

YOU were proving nothing to me, especially 10 times. I remember other people on this thread, not just myself. Are you trying to prove me wrong, or the other posters as well?

No one else made the ridiculous statement you made. You alone may take credit for "damage is NOT presumed". It was right up there with “Megan, no Federal Court will even consider allowing a Pro Se....”

I don’t know why you have such difficulty accepting your humanity. You were dead wrong...again. It wasn't the first time and it won't be the last. Get over it.

If it makes you feel better, I made a mistake in the thread about how to obtain docs from Canada. I thought Canada was a signatory on the Evidence Convention cause they are on the Service Convention. My bad. No need to get hysterical over it. :)
 

rmet4nzkx

Senior Member
Is this the offending internet posting?
http://www.ripoffreport.com/reports/ripoff88652.htm
Personally, I see nothing unusual or false about the claims, the use of illegals in the landscaping industry in CA and AZ, is common knowledge, done openly and in some cases "Day Laborer" hiring sites have street signs leading employers to them. When OP refers to having on site medical care, of course this is necessary when hiring illegals because this avoids INS raids due to W/C claims or injuries being reported by hospitals or Industrial injury providers.

Please note although this is a GA case, there are references to CA and AZ case law and reference to USSC case law, not only defamation law, but also internet and 1st amendment rights come into play. In this case "Moon Valley Nursery" is a public entity.
http://www.lawskills.com/case/ga/id/56321/
.......
Beginning in 1964 with its decision in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (84 SC 7, 11 LE2d 686, 95 ALR2d 1412), the Supreme Court of the United States has become increasingly involved in state libel and slander law in its attempt to reconcile state law, as to an individual's right to vindicate in civil courts his good name and reputation, with a competing interest grounded in the constitutional command of the First Amendment. 2 The court held that the First Amendment limits a state's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct. This First Amendment protection was conditioned on a lack of actual malice, i.e., knowledge that a statement is false or reckless disregard of whether or not it is false. "The constitutional guarantees [of freedom of speech and press] require . . . a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice' -- that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New York Times, supra, 376 U. S. at 279 (84 SC at 726, 11 LE2d at 706) (1964). That same proscription was extended to "public figures" as well. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra, 388 U. S. at 155 (87 SC at 1991, 18 LE2d at 1111) (1967); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn. v. Bresler, supra, 398 U. S. at 11 (90 SC at 1540, 26 LE2d at 13) (1970).

We agree with the observation of Chief Judge Lawrence in Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. (S.D. Ga., 1976), 411 FSupp. 440, 446 (appeal pending), that this "federalization of state law and the resulting
restriction on recovery for libel requires major adjustments in the law of defamation as codified and interpreted in Georgia in relation to press, periodicals and broadcasting. Common law libel [and slander] wears a very different aspect in the light of latter day constitutional doctrine." Defamed public officials and public figures can recover only upon a showing of actual malice, i.e., "only on clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth." States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, 418 U. S. at 342, 349 (94 SC at 3008, 3011, 41 LE2d at 807).
 

mpav

Junior Member
Moon Valley Nursery Update

I'm impressed with all the responses.

Yes it is hard to prove damage, but the fact of the matter is that this is affecting potential customers perception of the credibility of Moon Valley Nursery. We've had a few inquiries as to what the situation is and been able to explain that all the postings regarding Moon Valley Nurery and "slave labor" are just the work of a disgruntled ex employee.

As far as the actual postings that this individual made, there are items that he states as fact, not opinion that can be proven wrong. He states that Moon Valley Nursery does not pay it's employees properly in accordance with state and federal laws. He states that Moon Valley Nursery practices slave labor. He states that he has evidence of discrimination as well. He even states in his post that this is his sworn testimony. I know for a fact that these statements can be proven false. In fact, he solicited the counsel of one of Arizona's most prominent civil rights attorneys, who told him he doesn't have any legal ground to stand on and that he should stop what he's doing before he gets sued. (he even put this information in some of his own postings)

I know proving the damage could be tricky, but if these statements can be proven false (which they can), can legal action be taken against this individual. If so, what (obviously an opinion and won't be taken as anything other than) is the best course of action.
Mpav
 

rmet4nzkx

Senior Member
Please note that 4 of the responses re "defamation per se. Damages are presumed" were by a poster without any legal background and who was banned shortly after editing their initial post on this thread, notice the designation as "Guest". Their advice is questionable at best and they are known for giving false and misleading "advice". While you may be confident that in your opinion, some claims are and can be proven to be false, there is great breath allowed in the interpretation of free speach issues. The point I made about day laborors/illegals is a one such issue where hiring of illegals could be seen a "slave labor" even if you pay them according to state and federal guidelines and they present with a SSN, so any litigation from either side. This is somthing almost impossible to avoid in the landscaping industry at least in border states. Both sides are up front to some extent, you are clearly using the name of your business and they are posting their name.
 

Find the Right Lawyer for Your Legal Issue!

Fast, Free, and Confidential
data-ad-format="auto">
Top