Teryl Park said:
The security lights have been out since 6-00. I have talked to the owner about them many times. Street lights have been out since 10-00. I came home from work Thrusday 5-10-01 at 10pm when I went to get out of my car my phone fell I bent over to pick it up and I was pushed into my car and the purse was grabbed. I've been experiencing stiff neck. Stress. Im paranoid now. The owner called and said she feels resposible for it not to worry about rent since rent was in my purse. I then found out the tenants in apartment #1 have a switch in there closet to the security lights. Is the owner as well as the city liable?
My response:
LANDLORD LIABILITY FOR INJURIES FROM ACTS OF OTHERS
Tenants and Patrons Injured From Third Party Criminal Conduct (Failure to Provide Security Against Crime): The Ca Civil § 1714(a) general duty of care in the management of property and the Ca Civil § 1941 duty to render residential leased premises "tenantable" may, in some cases, embrace a duty to take reasonable steps to protect tenants and their guests or business patrons from third party criminal and tortious acts. When the duty exists, tenants, guests and "invitees" injured by third persons on the premises may have a cause of action against the landlord. [O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp. Intercoast Management (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 798, 802-803, 142 Cal.Rptr. 487, 489-490]
Establishing landlord's duty: As in any negligence action, whether a duty was owed under the facts is a question of law for the court. [Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 678, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 137, 142; Kentucky Fried Chicken of Calif., Inc. v. Super.Ct. (Brown) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 814, 819, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 756, 759; see also Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital (1985) 38 Cal.3d 112, 124, 211 Cal.Rptr. 356, 361--duty issue raises question of law to be determined on case-by-case basis]
In determining the existence of a duty, the court weighs the foreseeability of harm with other criteria and policy considerations to determine whether liability should be imposed given the facts of the specific case. [Thai v. Stang (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1264, 1271, 263 Cal.Rptr. 202, 205]
Scope of duty--balancing foreseeability of harm and landlord's burden: The scope of the landlord's duty in a particular case is determined in part by balancing the foreseeability of the harm against the burden of the duty to be imposed. [Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, supra, 6 Cal.4th at 678, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d at 145]
In cases where the burden of preventing future harm is great, a high degree of foreseeability may be required. Conversely, in cases where the harm can be prevented by simple means, a lesser degree of foreseeability may be required. [Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, supra, 6 Cal.4th at 678, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d at 145; see Pamela W. v. Millsom (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 950, 958, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 690, 695]
For purposes of defining the existence and scope of duty owed, foreseeability is a question of law to be decided by the court. [Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, supra, 6 Cal.4th at 678, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d at 145]
Knowledge of prior criminal events as factor: The threshold issue is whether the landlord had reason to anticipate risks of third party criminal activity (or other tortious conduct) on the premises. If the landlord had reason to know of a particular risk, he or she has a duty to warn tenants (or their guests and invitees) and take reasonable security precautions for their benefit. [O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp. Intercoast Management, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d at 803, 142 Cal.Rptr. at 490; see Onciano v. Golden Palace Restaurant, Inc. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 385, 268 Cal.Rptr. 96]
On the other hand, no landlord negligence liability attaches in the absence of evidence the landlord was put on notice, or had reason to know, of the threat of criminal activity in or around the premises and that the landlord could reasonably have prevented the particular harm. [Thai v. Stang, supra; Gregorian v. National Convenience Stores, Inc. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 944, 948-949, 220 Cal.Rptr. 302, 304; see Pamela W. v. Millsom, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at 959-960, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d at 695-696]
Totality of the circumstances test: Traditionally, foreseeability of the risk does not necessarily turn on whether the same type of activity or event already occurred on the premises. Rather, the issue is whether, in light of all the facts and circumstances (including the nature, condition and location of the premises, as well as the landlord's prior experience), the landlord had reason to anticipate the general character of the event or harm, not its precise nature or manner of occurrence. [Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital (1985) 38 Cal.3d 112, 129, 211 Cal.Rptr. 356, 364; Onciano v. Golden Palace Restaurant, Inc., supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at 392, 268 Cal.Rptr. at 99]
Prior similar incidents required to impose burdensome duty: However, where a "burdensome" duty is to be imposed on the landowner (e.g., requiring heightened security measures), a "high degree of foreseeability" is required. "[T]he requisite degree of foreseeability rarely, if ever, can be proven in the absence of prior similar incidents of violent crime on the landowner's premises." [Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, supra, 6 Cal.4th at 679, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d at 145--landlord owed no duty to commercial tenant's employee raped by unknown assailant during business hours on leased store's premises; Pamela W. v. Millsom, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at 958-959, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d at 695--landlord owed no duty to residential tenant raped by "stalker"]
Notice of prior similar incidents: Further, in these cases, the landlord must be on notice, having particularized information, of prior similar incidents which occurred on the property. [Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, supra, 6 Cal.4th at 679, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d at 146]
Statistical crime rate in area: Evidence of the statistical crime rate in the surrounding area is not sufficient to demonstrate the requisite notice. [Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, supra, 6 Cal.4th at 679, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d at 145; Pamela W. v. Millsom, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at 957, 959, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d at 694, 695, fn. 6]
IAAL
