The rest of the relevant passage.
(I found I couldn't edit out sections without changing meaning.)
[50] As in Loehr, supra, (and unlike Independent Housing Services, Eureka Teacher's Assn. and Harris, supra), the trial court in this case impliedly found that the request for damages was not merely incidental to a transcendent interest in injunctive relief but was the primary relief sought. The reasons are not hard to find. Gatto, an individual who sued in his own behalf and never expressed interest in vindicating rights of anyone other than himself, expressed his personal pecuniary interest by filing a claim in which he informed the county that the damages he sought for the injury he suffered "exceeds amount permitted by Government Code section 910 to be included in [the] claim," and that in a suit to be filed in "either State or Federal Court" he would seek not just injunctive relief but "attorney's fees and punitive damages in [the] combined amount of $35,000.00." Nothing in the record suggests Gatto ever considered his interest in obtaining money damages subsidiary to his interest in injunctive relief. Damages are the first thing mentioned in the title of his complaint and the prayer for relief, and the title of the complaint cites the specific provisions of the Unruh Act creating liability for actual damages (§ 52, subd. (a)) and authorizing individuals to institute civil actions for such damages. (§ 52.1, subd. (b).) The fact that Gatto recovered only $1,000, then the minimum amount recoverable under section 52, is of no significance, as it is the fact, not the amount, of damages that is important. Moreover, putting aside the $23,700 he received in attorney fees and costs, the $1,000 Gatto recovered as damages was the only relief he obtained; the trial court found it unnecessary to grant injunctive relief because the operator of the Fair voluntarily withdrew or appropriately modified the dress code found to have been unconstitutional.
[51] Exempting damage actions under sections 51 and 52.1 from the claim filing requirement, even in a case in which that is the primary relief sought, as appellants urge, would conflict with the statutory scheme relating to damage claims against public entities and with the relevant case law. "The `purpose of the [statutory requirements for presenting claims against the state or a local public entity] is to facilitate early investigation of disputes and settlement without trial if appropriate, as well as to enable the public entity to engage in fiscal planning for potential liabilities and to avoid similar liabilities in the future.' " (Lewis C. Nelson & Sons, Inc. v. Clovis Unified School Dist. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 64, 72, quoting Baines Pickwick, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th 298, 303.) Mindful of the mandatory nature of the claim filing requirements (see, e.g., Gov. Code, §§ 905, 905.2), a division of this District has held that the Legislature intended all claims for money or damages against a public entity to be governed by the statutory procedure "unless specifically exempted." (Gehman v. Superior Court (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 257, 262, disapproved on other grounds in People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Superior Court (1979) 26 Cal.3d 746, 758, fn. 5; but see, Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 868-869.) In Government Code section 905, the Legislature enumerated 12 types of claims against local public entities that are excepted from the mandatory filing requirement (Gov. Code, § 905, subds (a) - (l)); claims for damages for violation of sections 51 and 52.1 are not among them. As has been noted, "commentators have construed the section 905 exceptions as essentially non-tortious claims `for which some other adequate claims procedure has already been devised, or for which the procedural protection of the Tort Claims Act is believed to be unnecessary.' " (Dalton v. East Bay Mun. Utility Dist. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1574, quoting Cal. Gov. Tort Liability Prac. (Cont.Ed.Bar 1992) § 6.24, pp. 651-652.)
[52] Exceptions to the filing requirement not specifically enumerated in the Government Claims Act have occasionally been allowed, but only where the claim is based on a statute or statutory scheme that includes a functionally equivalent claim process. Snipes v. City of Bakersfield, supra, 145 Cal.App.3d 861 is illustrative. That case was an action against a city and its police department for employment discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act. (Gov. Code, §§ 12900 et seq.) (FEHA).) The trial court sustained a general demurrer without leave to amend on the ground that the plaintiff failed to allege that he complied with the claim filing requirement of the Government Claims Act. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the purpose and procedures of the FEHA demonstrate a legislative intent that actions against governmental entities brought under the FEHA are to be excepted from the general requirements of the Tort Claims Act." (Id. at p. 865.) After describing the statutory scheme in considerable detail, the court explained its reasoning: "The procedural guidelines and the time framework provided in the FEHA are special rules for this particular type of claim which control over the general rules governing claims against governmental entities. The FEHA not only creates a statutory cause of action, but sets out a comprehensive scheme for administrative enforcement, emphasizing conciliation, persuasion, and voluntary compliance, and containing specific limitations periods." (Id. at p. 868.) The statutes Gatto relies upon contain no comparable provisions, and there is, therefore, no reason to exempt actions under those statutes from the claim filing requirement when the primary relief sought against the state or a local public entity is money damages.
[53] The fact that federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are exempt from the requirements of the Government Claims Act also provides no reason to exempt claims under sections 51 and 52.1, despite the similarity of the claims that can be made under the federal and state statutes. Section 1983 claims are exempt from the state claims requirements because the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution does not permit a state law to alter or restrict federally created rights. As our Supreme Court has noted, "the filing of a claim for damages `is more than a procedural requirement, it is a condition precedent to plaintiff's maintaining an action against defendants, in short, an integral part of plaintiff's cause of action.' And while it may be constitutionally permissible for the Legislature to place this substantive impediment in the path of a state cause of action, it is clear that the supremacy clause will not permit a like abrogation of the perquisites of a federal civil rights litigant." (Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 842.) Conditioning damage claims against public entities under the Unruh Act (however it may be defined) on compliance with the Government Claims Act presents no such constitutional problem.
[54] For the foregoing reasons, the trial court correctly concluded that the Government Claims Act applied to this action and extended the limitations period beyond the one year specified in section 340 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Because Gatto filed his complaint in the superior court within six months from the date of the notice he received of the rejection of his claim (Gov. Code, §§ 911.8, subd. (b), 913, subd. (b)), it was not time barred. *fn12
