Discovery question

[LdiJ]

I have not yet. I just want to know if such things exist. I worry more about the courts seeing she is dishonest than prosecution. We have 4 small children that custody still looms.

Others have said this but I want to say it too. Custody is NOT going to be based on whether or not your stbx wife is lying about her income. Custody is going to be decided based on the best interests of the children. If you google "best interests of the child standards" for your state, you will see what factors are taken into consideration in deciding the best interests of children.

 

[Litigator22]

It is not relevant to the OP's inquiry because the OP's case is in Tennessee and the decisions of the Supreme Court of Georgia are, of course not binding on the Tennessee courts. Moreover, as the decision is interpreting Georgia law on discovery the decision is likely not even terribly useful for persuasive value in the unlikely event the Tennessee courts have not spoken on the issue since Tennessee and Georgia have different discovery rules.

With all due respect and acknowledging that the Ballard case was largely resolved on "settled principles of Georgia law" I fail to see any justification for the suggestion that because "they have different discovery rules" - Tennessee might find that Georgia's interpretation of their rules of little persuasive value when with respect to their scope and limits those discovery rules are written word for word:

"(1) IN GENERAL. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . " Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 26.02

"(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . " Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A) 9-11-26 General provisions governing discovery "

(Noting that unlike Rule 26 (a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure neither that of Georgia or Tennessee expressly exclude from disclosure evidence that intended for impeachment purposes. But also noting that neither mandates such disclosure.)
__________________

Again Ballard was based on settled principles of local law. But I fail to see those principles as being provincially unique or one of a kind. So assuming that the OP's inquiry were a case of first impression in Tennessee (and Ballard was proposed as a "persuasive" precedent under the principle of stare decisis) let me ask you this:

Do you think Tennessee courts would find any fault with this rationale by the Georgia Supreme Court in refusing to suppress impeaching evidence because of a procedural nicety:

"Although pretrial disclosure is a laudable goal, the essence of the judicial system in Georgia and throughout the United States is the adversarial trial process."

"The object of all legal investigation is the discovery of truth. Consistent with this statutory mandate, the policy of Georgia law is to admit evidence, even if its admissibility is doubtful, because it is more dangerous to suppress the truth than to allow a loophole for falsehood. The trial court's ruling in this case (precluding the admissibility of impeaching documentary evidence) is at odds with this principle, since it authorizes the exclusion of relevant impeaching evidence and allows the credibility of a crucial witness to go unchallenged. Clearly, this subordination of the discovery of the truth to a mere procedural device is erroneous. In a trial, the credibility of the witnesses is a matter which should be resolved by the jurors who have heard all of the relevant evidence, and not by the text of the pretrial order."

"(Otherwise) A party's witnesses could lie on the stand and then that party can object to the introduction of any impeaching documents which were not expressly listed in the pretrial order." (Citations omitted)

 

[quincy]

With all due respect and acknowledging that the Ballard case was largely resolved on "settled principles of Georgia law" I fail to see any justification for the suggestion that because "they have different discovery rules" - Tennessee might find that Georgia's interpretation of their rules of little persuasive value when with respect to their scope and limits those discovery rules are written word for word:

"(1) IN GENERAL. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . " Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 26.02

"(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . " Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A) 9-11-26 General provisions governing discovery "

(Noting that unlike Rule 26 (a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure neither that of Georgia or Tennessee expressly exclude from disclosure evidence that intended for impeachment purposes. But also noting that neither mandates such disclosure.)
__________________

Again Ballard was based on settled principles of local law. But I fail to see those principles as being provincially unique or one of a kind. So assuming that the OP's inquiry were a case of first impression in Tennessee (and Ballard was proposed as a "persuasive" precedent under the principle of stare decisis) let me ask you this:

Do you think Tennessee courts would find any fault with this rationale by the Georgia Supreme Court in refusing to suppress impeaching evidence because of a procedural nicety:

"Although pretrial disclosure is a laudable goal, the essence of the judicial system in Georgia and throughout the United States is the adversarial trial process."

"The object of all legal investigation is the discovery of truth. Consistent with this statutory mandate, the policy of Georgia law is to admit evidence, even if its admissibility is doubtful, because it is more dangerous to suppress the truth than to allow a loophole for falsehood. The trial court's ruling in this case (precluding the admissibility of impeaching documentary evidence) is at odds with this principle, since it authorizes the exclusion of relevant impeaching evidence and allows the credibility of a crucial witness to go unchallenged. Clearly, this subordination of the discovery of the truth to a mere procedural device is erroneous. In a trial, the credibility of the witnesses is a matter which should be resolved by the jurors who have heard all of the relevant evidence, and not by the text of the pretrial order."

"(Otherwise) A party's witnesses could lie on the stand and then that party can object to the introduction of any impeaching documents which were not expressly listed in the pretrial order." (Citations omitted)

Are you trying to say you found nothing of relevance to the state of Tennessee?

 

[Taxing Matters]

Do you think Tennessee courts would find any fault with this rationale by the Georgia Supreme Court in refusing to suppress impeaching evidence because of a procedural nicety:

I don't know, as I've had no occasion to research the Tennessee court decisions to see if they've ever spoken on that principle. But while you may agree with the Georgia courts stance on the matter — and perhaps a majority of states would as well — I've lived in enough different places and researched the law while in those places enough to know that there are occasions in which one or more states depart from what everyone else does. Lawyers who assume the law in State X is the same as their own state's law or the law in the majority of states can get burned by that assumption. But I stand by my assertion that your claim that Ballard is (as opposed to might be) on point for the OP is wrong for the simple reason, which you seemingly now acknowledge, that the decisions of the Supreme Court of Georgia are not binding on the Tennessee courts and thus are not law in Tennessee. Perhaps the Tennessee Supreme Court would hold as the Georgia Court did in Ballard, but it does not have to do so and thus a conclusion that "Ballard vs. Meyers is explicitly relevant to the OP's inquiry," as you put it, is in my view erroneous.

 

[Litigator22]

I don't know, as I've had no occasion to research the Tennessee court decisions to see if they've ever spoken on that principle. But while you may agree with the Georgia courts stance on the matter — and perhaps a majority of states would as well — I've lived in enough different places and researched the law while in those places enough to know that there are occasions in which one or more states depart from what everyone else does. Lawyers who assume the law in State X is the same as their own state's law or the law in the majority of states can get burned by that assumption. But I stand by my assertion that your claim that Ballard is (as opposed to might be) on point for the OP is wrong for the simple reason, which you seemingly now acknowledge, that the decisions of the Supreme Court of Georgia are not binding on the Tennessee courts and thus are not law in Tennessee. Perhaps the Tennessee Supreme Court would hold as the Georgia Court did in Ballard, but it does not have to do so and thus a conclusion that "Ballard vs. Meyers is explicitly relevant to the OP's inquiry," as you put it, is in my view erroneous.

If you please, I referred the OP to the Ballard decision because it "explicitly " stands for the proposition that an evidentiary document intended to be used for purposes of impeachment (when and if needed) DOES NOT need to be disclosed in the pre-trial discovery process! Which rationale if applied would favor the OP's desire to withhold from discovery some likewise impeaching material. Nowhere have I even intimated that it would be applicable in Tennessee or that it would be decisive of the issue.

Now if you want to nit-pick over modifiers so be it, but if you'll set aside your penchant for finding fault with my postings and read Ballard in conjunction with the OP's question you must honestly admit the Georgia case is clearly relevant. On all fours it is relevant.

As to your comments about your so-called diversity of individual state laws: Once again honesty and realism will compel you to admit that (outside of procedural devices) there is more harmony than disharmony. Ten fold more harmony! The term happens to be American Jurisprudence, not individual state jurisprudence!

Frankly I'm a bit disappointed in the way you have slanted your responses favoring contributors to this thread who have never seen the inside of a law school nor heard of the principle of stare decisis. Not to mention one prominent contributor who seems to believe that the Georgia Supreme Court is part of the federal court system. Lastly:

I've lived in enough different places and researched the law while in those places . . .

Strangely I wasn't aware of the need to be in a different place in order to research the laws of that particular place! There are numerous watersheds and several mountain ranges between where I sit and Atlanta, Georgia, the site of the Georgia Supreme Court, but I was able chase down its reported case of Ballard vs. Meyers without suffering the climate. (As Rodney Dangerfield described it: "A sauna with gnats!")

 

[Taxing Matters]

Nowhere have I even intimated that it would be applicable in Tennessee or that it would be decisive of the issue.

That is not the impression I got from your posts. But I'll accept that it was not your intention to say that it was.

As to your comments about your so-called diversity of individual state laws: Once again honesty and realism will compel you to admit that (outside of procedural devices) there is more harmony than disharmony. Ten fold more harmony! The term happens to be American Jurisprudence, not individual state jurisprudence!

In at least certain areas of law there is indeed a great deal of harmony, in some others, not as much. Each state has it's own statutes and courts for reason: they have the option to do things differently from their sister states. Such is the flexibility of a federal system. If we didn't want that, we could opt for a system more like that of other nations in which most law is set at the national level for everyone. So I'll not apologize for pointing out that Tennessee might take a different position here than Georgia.

Frankly I'm a bit disappointed in the way you have slanted your responses favoring contributors to this thread who have never seen the inside of a law school nor heard of the principle of stare decisis.

I post disagreement with you when I think you are in error. I do not do it to support any other person on this site. Indeed, I'm pretty sure I have disagreed with pretty much everyone on this site at one time or another.

I also have posted my dislike of some of your posts that I find condescending or insulting to others, and I'll not apologize for that either.

Strangely I wasn't aware of the need to be in a different place in order to research the laws of that particular place!

Another example of your snarky impulses. I of course never said that you needed to be in a different place to research the law in other jurisdictions, which I'm sure you well know. I was simply providing context for why I have had the need to so. In my experience at least, lawyers who have practiced in only one jurisdiction for a long time start to think that the way that their state does things is the way it is done everywhere because that is what they are used to. Not having had much need to research the law elsewhere, they haven't had the occasion to see many differences and that leads them to assume things are much the same everywhere. Not all lawyers do that, of course, but I've seen some who have made such assumptions, to their cost when they later learn of their mistake.