Although the following three issues are questions of law that can ONLY be determined by a court, let’s just say these decisions went the way most favorable to the defendant.
The plaintiff in this case qualifies as a “public figure”.
The web site qualifies as a “news source”.
The allegations qualify as a matter of public concern.
BB wrote: In this case, and from the clear language of the posted URL reference, this was a news story which NEVER stated for a fact that the subject of the article WAS guilty, only that 'it has been reported'. And that is why this is not libel. On any party.
Megan writes: The insertion of a few "disclaimers" does not turn that which is offered as fact, into "opinion". The media never said Richard Jewell WAS guilty of planting the bomb at the Olympics. I believe Jewell’s settlement with NBC was for $500,000.00.
A good explanation of what constitutes opinion in libel is found in the following, which involves a public individual who sued the New York Times for libel:
http://www.law.cornell.edu/nyctap/search/display.html?terms=criminal and procedure not liibulletin&url=/nyctap/I93_0205.htm
The part most relevant to the poster’s question follows as the Court describes the nature of the New York Times articles:
"Additionally, although the articles contain many assertions that would be understood by the reasonable reader as mere hypotheses premised on stated facts, there are also actionable charges made in the articles -- such as the charges that plaintiff engaged in cover-ups, directed the creation of "misleading" autopsy reports and was guilty of "possibly illegal" conduct -- that, although couched in the language of hypothesis or conclusion, actually would be understood by the reasonable reader as assertions of fact (see, Rinaldi v Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 NY2d 369, 382).”
So you see, the overall presentation of the allegations can negate any "technical" disclaimers.
BB wrote: The U.S. Supreme Court has already ruled that online publications enjoy the same protections of 'first amendment' as do legitimate publications and that even if they suspect or 'know' that the publishing of the information may be false, the plaintiff must also show INTENT on the part of the publication to enjoy the rights and privileges of libel.
Megan writes: The Supreme Court has made no ruling that requires a libel plaintiff to address "intent". If someone publishes defamatory material they suspect or know is false, WHY they did it is irrelevant to the cause of action (though it may affect the damage award).
BB may be referring to the requirement that a public figure libel plaintiff must show “actual malice” on the part of the publisher. “Actual malice” is either knowledge that a statement is false, or reckless disregard for truth or falsity of the statement. “Actual malice” has to do with the publisher’s attitude toward the truth, whereas “malice” has to do with the publisher’s attitude towards the person.
A public figure plaintiff needs to prove the statement was false, capable of defamatory meaning, communicated to a third party, who understood the defamation was about the plaintiff, and that the publisher acted either with malice or with a reckless disregard for the truth. If the defamation qualifies as Libel Per Se, the plaintiff need not prove actual damages.
I am not an attorney.