Here's a good read for you. the case law from the supreme court including the foundation requirements.... there's also a blurb about the 1/4 mile thing... doesn't look too good though
01/03/79 COMMONWEALTH v. KATHLEEN WHYNAUGHT
[1] SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[2] [Editor's note: the court provided no docket number in the original opinion]
[3] 1979.MA.7 <http://www.versuslaw.com>, 384 N.E.2d 1212, 377 Mass. 14
[4] January 3, 1979
[5] COMMONWEALTH
v.
KATHLEEN WHYNAUGHT
[6] SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
[7] Evidence, Speed, Radar speed measuring device, Competency, Judicial discretion. Motor Vehicle, Operation.
[8] Middlesex. Complaint received and sworn to in the First District Court of Southern Middlesex on October 19, 1976. The case was heard by Chernoff, J.
[9] Michael J. McHugh, Legal Assistant to the District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
[10] Aram K. Berberian, of Rhode Island, for the defendant.
[11] Hennessey, C.j., Quirico, Braucher, Wilkins, & Liacos, JJ.
[12] The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hennessey
[13] Although evidence of the accuracy of a radar speed measuring device was insufficient, this court affirmed the conviction of a defendant charged with speeding where the issue of the proper testing of such devices had not previously been raised in this Commonwealth, where the police followed testing habits which had been consistently acceptable and unchallenged in the trial courts, where the radar reading showed evidence of a speed greatly in excess of the legal limit, and where the observations of a police officer were corroborative of the reading on the radar unit. [20-21]
[14] This court declared its intention to reverse any conviction and order that a judgment for the defendant be entered in any speeding case tried after the date of this opinion, where radar readings from untested equipment are admitted over objection and without independent corroborative evidence. [21]
[15] The provisions of G. L. c. 90, § 17, did not require that at the trial of a defendant charged with speeding the Commonwealth prove that the defendant exceeded the speed limit for a distance of at least one quarter of a mile. [21-22]
[16] The defendant, Kathleen Whynaught, was convicted of speeding pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 17, after a jury waived trial in the First District Court of Southern Middlesex. Appealing her conviction, she argues that the trial Judge erroneously admitted readings taken from an untested radar speed measuring device and that the prosecution had a statutory burden, which it failed to meet, to prove excessive operation over a one-quarter mile course. We overrule the defendant's exceptions.
[17] The facts are not in dispute. On August 19, 1976, State Trooper Michael Salzman, the detection half of a two-person traffic control unit, was operating a radar device on Route 495 near Hopkinton. Observing readings from the radar unit, Trooper Salzman determined that an automobile was travelling seventy-five miles an hour on a highway posted for fifty-five. He so notified State Trooper John Brunnetta, the apprehending half of the unit, who stopped the defendant's vehicle and issued a citation.
[18] At trial, Trooper Salzman testified that the radar unit he employed was made by the Dacatur Company and was tested for accuracy by means of an internal calibration mechanism. The testing procedure, he explained, involved the selection of two specific settings, one at thirty miles an hour and another at sixty miles an hour; if the unit when turned to those settings read out the correct number on a screen, it was accepted to be accurate. This procedure, he said, was followed approximately every hour on the date of the offense, including once forty-five minutes prior to his clocking the defendant. In addition to his own testing, Trooper Salzman stated that the instrument had been calibrated on different occasions by a radio engineer, although no specific dates were indicated.
[19] The prosecution also offered the testimony of Trooper Brunnetta, who estimated that, on the basis of his independent observation of the defendant's vehicle, its speed was approximately seventy-five miles an hour. The officer testified that there was a clear area for visual observation, explaining "you could see the cars back easy."
[20] 1. Admissibility of Radar Evidence.
[21] Ever since the appearance of the automobile impelled lawmakers to enact laws to restrict its speed, law enforcement officers have experimented with various types of speed detection devices, seeking reliable methods by which to measure vehicular velocity. From the beginning, objective means of speed determination have been thought desirable, because opinion evidence, while admissible, may tend to leave doubts in the minds of Judges and jurors. E. C. Fisher & R. H. Reeder, Vehicle Traffic Law 143-144 (1974). Indeed, commencing with the acceptance of stopwatch evidence in Great Britain, see Gorham v. Brice, 18 T.L.R. 424 (K.B. Div. 1902), law enforcement officials and courts have increasingly depended on scientific devices as a means of enforcing speeding laws, and, in turn, preventing traffic accidents. See McCormick, Evidence § 210 (2d ed. 1972).
[22] In 1910 this court had occasion to consider the admissibility in a speeding case of evidence derived from a "Photo-Speed-Recorder." Commonwealth v. Buxton, 205 Mass. 49 (1910). The instrument challenged in that case determined an automobile's rate of speed through the use of a series of rapid sequence pictures and a chronometer; by comparing the photographs to measure the distance travelled, and then dividing by time, a motor vehicle's velocity could be easily calculated. In the belief that it would be beneficial to have objective proof from a "machine whose action dependent upon the uniform working of the laws of nature," we held "Photo-Speed-Recorder" evidence admissible in speeding prosecutions. Id. at 53.
[23] Since our decision in Buxton, we have not been called on to decide the admissibility of evidence derived from more sophisticated speed detection devices. Other jurisdictions, however, have considered such questions and have had no difficulty in sanctioning, for evidence purposes, the use of the speedometer, Spokane v. Knight, 96 Wash. 403 (1917), State v. Tarquinio, 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 566 (1966), or other electrical or mechanical recording instruments, see Webster Groves v. Quick, 323 S.W.2d 386 (Mo. App. 1959); People v. Pett, 13 Misc. 2d 975 (N.Y. Police J. Ct. 1958). The speed detection instrument most heavily relied on, and the one in most common use, is the radar speedmeter. *fn1 The application of radar to traffic control has been encouraged by the fact that those courts which have considered the issue have almost uniformly taken judicial notice of radar's underlying scientific principles and of the general capability of the speedmeter to measure speed accurately. See, e.g., State v. Dantonio, 18 N.J. 570 (1955); People v. Magri, 3 N.Y.2d 562 (1958); Evernight v. Little Rock, 230 Ark. 695 (1959); State v. Tomanelli, 153 Conn. 365 (1966); East Cleveland v. Ferell, 168 Ohio St. 298 (1958); United States v. Dreos, 156 F. Supp. 200 (D. Md. 1957) (applying Maryland law).
[24] Although the defendant does not challenge the validity of radar principles or their application to determining speed, we think it appropriate to state here our judicial notice of the radar speedmeter as an accurate and reliable means of measuring velocity. As we said in Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266, 269 (1963), and have repeated more recently in Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 196 (1975): "Judicial acceptance of a scientific theory or instrument can occur only when it follows a general acceptance by the community of scientists involved. When supported by substantial authority establishing scientific reliability, this court has not hesitated to accept the benefits of science." See also Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426, 430-431 (1978). In light of society's widespread use of radar devices, in forms ranging from air-traffic control monitors to homing radars on guided missiles, see M. Skolnick, Introduction to Radar Systems 14-18 (1962), and considering other courts' acceptance of radar, we view the scientific basis of radar as indisputable. *fn2