I disagree. I did correctly state the general rule used in Texas for contract cases. Rather, in this instance, you are the one who has it wrong. I don't disagree with the general points you specifically stated and the links to the sources you provided. It is true that Texas follows the American rule in that attorney's fees are, in general, only available where allowed by statute or by agreement of the parties. The problem is that you evidently didn't take the next step to ask whether the Texas statutes, unlike those in pretty much every other state, might actually have a provision the flips the usual rule in contract cases. Surprising though it may be (and I was surprised when I first encountered it because it is such a contrast from the rule used in other states), Texas does have just such a statute, TX Civil Practice & Rem Code § 38.001, which provides as follows:
(a) In this section, “organization” has the meaning assigned by Section 1.002, Business Organizations Code.
(b) A person may recover reasonable attorney's fees from an individual or organization other than a quasi-governmental entity authorized to perform a function by state law, a religious organization, a charitable organization, or a charitable trust, in addition to the amount of a valid claim and costs, if the claim is for:
(1) rendered services;
(2) performed labor;
(3) furnished material;
(4) freight or express overcharges;
(5) lost or damaged freight or express;
(6) killed or injured stock;
(7) a sworn account; or
(8) an oral or written contract.
You are correct that the recent TX bar article on the subject of award of attorneys is quite detailed. I'm going to guess you didn't really look at it very closely because it makes the same point I made earlier about contract cases, though with a lot more detail. On page nine of the article in the discussion of attorney's fees in Part B, which covers contract claims, point two discusses that partiular statutory provision. It starts out getting right to the heart of what that Code section does:
Chapter 38 as a basis for fees for plaintiffs in a breach of contract case.
Under one of the most widely used fee statutes in business disputes in Texas, “[a] person may recover reasonable attorney’s fees from an individual or corporation, . . . if the claim is for an oral or written contract.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 38.001(8). “To recover attorney’s fees under Section 38.001, a party represented by an attorney must present the claim, and (1) prevail on a cause of action for which attorney’s fees are recoverable, and (2) recover damages.” Green Int’l, Inc. v. Solis, 951 S.W.2d 384, 390 (Tex. 1997). Chapter 38 should be “liberally construed to promote its underlying purpose” of encouraging “contracting parties to pay their just debts and discourage...vexatious, time-consuming and unnecessary litigation.” Ventling v. Johnson, 466 S.W.3d 143, 155 (Tex. 2015).
If attorney’s fees are proper under Section 38.001 and supported by evidence, the trial court “has no discretion to deny” attorney’s fees. Ventling, 466 S.W.3d at 154. Furthermore, if “trial attorney’s fees are mandatory under Section 38.001, then appellate attorney’s fees are also mandatory when proof of reasonable fees is presented.” Id. A zero award for attorney’s fees is appropriate only if the evidence (1) failed to prove either that an attorney’s services were provided or the value of the services provided or (2) affirmatively showed that no attorney’s services were needed or that any services provided were of no value. Upshaw v. Lacado, LLC, 02-20-00031-CV, 2021 WL 3085757, at *14-15 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 22, 2021, no pet. h.) (trial court properly disregarded zero verdict in that case, but trial court erred in providing amount without submitting it to the jury, so a new trial on the amount of fees was warranted).
The breach of contract claimant must prevail and recover damages to recover attorney’s fees. Rohrmoos Venture, 578 S.W.3d at 484. The Supreme Court noted that in KB Home, the plaintiff was not a prevailing party eligible for fees under Chapter 38 because the “plaintiff recovered no damages, secured no declaratory or injunctive relief, obtained no consent decree or settlement in its favor and received nothing of value of any kind.” Id. at 485.
