tranquility
Senior Member
That, I agree with. While I thought many of the decisions by the judge were favorable to the prosecution, I thought the jury instructions were favorable to the defendant and it surprised me. They seemed confusing at best and seemed to repeat defenses to the crimes charged. The lack of the provocation negation of self defense instruction decision surprised me. (aka the "initial aggressor" instruction.) While I don't think there was any evidence to find Zimmerman was an initial aggressor under my understanding of Florida law on the matter, I would have thought that would have been a factual issue left to the jury. On further review, it does seem the guidelines in Florida's Gibbs require much more than the guidelines in Michigan on the mitigation or elimination of self-defense.Ha. Not at all, YAG. I am not suggesting that mainstream media has an agenda. Never. With the press, it is accuracy first and always.
Cataldo, by the way, is the chief of homicide for the Macomb County Prosecutors Office. I've spoken with other prosecutors who felt as he did, that in Michigan the case would have played out differently.
I read the jury instructions, tranquility, and they were the type of jury instructions I would want my jury to have if I were ever the defendant on trial for second-degree murder under similar circumstances.
(as an aside: I like the way you wrote your posts, Ladyback1 - very nice)
An "imperfect" self-defense claim (where the person claiming self defense was the original aggressor) can take second degree murder down to manslaughter as mentioned by the prosecutor. People v. Deason, 384 NW 2d 72 (1985):
However the case which describes aggressor in the (unlike in FL) the non-codified elimination of the self-defense defense was People v. Townes, 218 NW 2d 136 (1974). To the jury instruction (cut by me):"Imperfect self-defense" is a qualified defense which can mitigate an act of second-degree murder to voluntary manslaughter. People v Morrin, 31 Mich App 301, 311, fn 7; 187 NW2d 434 (1971), lv den 385 Mich 775 (1971). This qualified defense has been invoked elsewhere than in Michigan where a defense of self-defense fails because the defendant was the aggressor, or maintained an unreasonable belief of danger, or reacted with an unreasonable amount of force. State v Powell, 84 NJ 305, 313; 419 A2d 406 (1980).
With the facts of:an aggressor is not necessarily a person who strikes the first blow in a personal encounter, or makes the first demonstration indicating an intent to strike. But if a person with a malice and hatred in his heart towards such a person seeks to provoke a difficulty either by acts or words with the intent to induce such other person to strike the first blow, or to make the demonstration in order to form a pretext to take his life, then the Defendant could not avail himself of the right of self-defense.
Discussing:Appellant proceeded directly to an employee named Odom McMillion and began to loudly accuse McMillion of dating his wife. McMillion replied that he did not know what defendant was referring to and wanted to have no trouble with him.
Shortly after the verbal confrontation began, Jessie Burnett intervened and ordered appellant to leave the store. Burnett added that if the men had 583*583 any desire to continue their argument they should do so outside of his store.
When appellant refused to leave, Burnett went into his office and obtained a pistol. He returned with the gun at his side and without pointing it at appellant, again ordered him to leave. Appellant protested Burnett's action but soon raised his hands and backed out of the store followed by Burnett.The trial testimony diverges at this point. All of the prosecution's witnesses generally testified that after appellant backed out of the store, Burnett placed the gun in a holster he was wearing, turned and started to walk to the inner part of the store. Appellant then suddenly reentered the store and began shooting at Burnett, fatally wounding him.
Appellant stated a markedly different version of the fatal shooting. He testified that he was very frightened when Burnett confronted him with the gun and remained in fear as Burnett holstered the gun but kept his hand on it. While the men were still facing each other Burnett made a "very sudden motion" that appeared to appellant to be an effort to draw the gun back out of the holster. Appellant stated that he then instantaneously reacted by reaching for a gun he carried in his belt and shot Burnett in what he believed was self-defense.
The self-defense instruction was premised on the 592*592 incorrect assumption that there had been some evidence introduced at trial from which the jury could reasonably infer that appellant was the "aggressor" in the fatal confrontation with Burnett. The court apparently focused on appellant's conduct with respect to Odom McMillion and erroneously assumed that if appellant was at fault in provoking a disturbance in the tire store, he could then be held legally accountable as an aggressor for any response to his conduct, whether by McMillion or any other person. This was error. Appellant may only be held legally accountable as an aggressor for responsive conduct by another that is reasonably attributable to appellant's own conduct. See Cartwright v State, 14 Tex Ct App R 486, 498-499, 502 (1883). In the present case there was no evidence that would support the inferences created by the self-defense instruction that Burnett's actions were a legally reasonable response to appellant's conduct and therefore, that appellant was an "aggressor" with respect to Burnett.
According to all the testimony developed at trial, the singular purpose underlying Burnett's intervention into the confrontation between appellant and McMillion was Burnett's desire to avoid a disruption in his store. There was no testimony to indicate that Burnett intervened to protect McMillion or Burnett's own person or that appellant's actions were designed as a pretext to draw Burnett into a situation where appellant could take Burnett's life. The only reasonable conclusion from the trial testimony is that appellant's actions created a potential threat to Burnett's property and it was to this threat that Burnett responded; but, a threat to property in such a situation, is not a legally sufficient provocation to render appellant an aggressor.
593*593 "It may be conceded that everything that was done by defendant in the transaction, up to the moment of the final attack by the deceased, was unlawful and wrongful; yet, if that assault was felonious and was of such a character as to clearly indicate an intention by the assailant to take defendant's life, or to inflict on him some enormous bodily injury, there is no valid ground for holding that he was precluded from the right to defend himself against it by the mere fact that he had been, or then was engaged in the commission of a trespass upon the property of the deceased. * * *
"The general doctrine undoubtedly is that one who has taken the life of an assailant, but who was himself in the wrong, cannot avail himself of the plea of self-defense. But the wrong which will preclude him from making that defense must relate to the assault in resistance of which the assailant was killed. If at the time the assault is made upon him, he is engaged in the commission of an act which is wrongful, but which is independent of the assault he may lawfully defend himself against it, to the extent even of slaying the assailant, if it is felonious, unless, indeed, his act is of such a character as to justify the assault. The mere fact, then, that defendant was engaged in committing a trespass when deceased attacked him * * *, does not necessarily constitute him a wrong-doer in the matter of the assault, or preclude him from making the defense of self-defense." State v Perigo, 70 Iowa 657, 666; 28 NW 452 (1886).