TigerD
Senior Member
He isn't your realtor. He is their realtor.seller is paying
TD
He isn't your realtor. He is their realtor.seller is paying
I am disgusted. Even when the realtor representing the buyer ends up being paid by the seller the realtor has an obligation to truly represent the buyer...and in fact is stupid to do otherwise because it damages their reputation.seller is paying
Check your contract. I'll bet it specifies that all this communication should be written and signed, not emailed and texted.Well I offered for seller to repair the leaking problem and other issues but my realtor told me today, I have no proof that the basement needs work since his inspector said the leaks are minimal, so I have no basis for said repairs. I have made an appointment with a lawyer for Thursday, guess I should have done that already but I had hoped this could be worked out amicably. Sunday is when I received the inspection report and I have made an offer and made clear what I want to be repaired before I buy. My realtor is rejecting my repair list so I'm not sure if he has passed the info along to the seller, I know I have limited time to notify seller of repairs I want. I sent the offer through email and have told my realtor that I will only communicate through texts or emails. I just want some kind of proof of what is going on.
Ok I will check on thisCheck your contract. I'll bet it specifies that all this communication should be written and signed, not emailed and texted.
actually, no, they don't. unless they are contracted to the buyer (dual agent with lot's of disclosure or a buyer's agent) they are legally obligated to their client, the seller. Acting otherwise could get them sued for a breach of their agency agreement.LdiJ;3325842]I am disgusted. Even when the realtor representing the buyer ends up being paid by the seller the realtor has an obligation to truly represent the buyer...and in fact is stupid to do otherwise because it damages their reputation.
while a lawyer really shouldn't be necessary for this, I suspect due to the OP's naivety in RE it is probably the best advice and best direction he can choose.I suspect that once you get the real estate attorney involved that your realtor will quickly reverse his/her position but its sad that you have to take it to that level.
Or the person had to sell the house.So you're saying a person had to buy the house?
Both of those cases involved a seller who was ordered to complete a sale...not a buyer. I absolutely agree that there can be consequences for a buyer who does not follow through on a sale. However, until somebody shows me case law that says otherwise I am very skeptical of any claim that a buyer can be forced to complete a sale.Or the person had to sell the house.
Specific performance is a remedy (potentially) available to buyers or sellers in real estate transactions to enforce the terms of a contract. Specific performance requires that the contract be performed exactly to its terms. In other words, a buyer can be forced to buy and a seller can be forced to sell. This is not a common remedy for ordinary real estate sales but, as with everything in law, facts matter. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 70.
Although I didn't run across any cases out of Ohio, here are links to summaries of two real estate contracts that were enforced through an award to the plaintiff of specific performance (I have other cases but not with easy links):
From Maine, here is a summary of Sullivan v. Porter, 861 A.2d 625 (2004): http://www.lawnix.com/cases/sullivan-porter.html
From Rhode Island, here is a summary of Lajayi v. Fafiyebi, 860 A.2d 680 (2004): http://www.realtor.org/legal-case-summaries/lajayi-v-fafiyebi-diligent-buyer-entitled-to-specific-performance
If there is a valid and binding contract and the terms of this contract are breached by one of the parties to the contract, specific performance is one of several different remedies available.
I am sorry you remain skeptical of the laws that govern contracts, LdiJ.Both of those cases involved a seller who was ordered to complete a sale...not a buyer. I absolutely agree that there can be consequences for a buyer who does not follow through on a sale. However, until somebody shows me case law that says otherwise I am very skeptical of any claim that a buyer can be forced to complete a sale.
Yes, I am saying I was able to force the house purchase.So you're saying a person had to buy the house?
Wrong. I am talking about forcing a buyer to buy a home when all the contingencies had been met.I think that she is talking about contracts in general.
Kesler actually proves my point.I am sorry you remain skeptical of the laws that govern contracts, LdiJ.
The fact is that both sellers and buyers have four remedies available to them when one or the other has breached the purchase and sale of real estate. For buyers, the remedies are to sue for damages, or rescind the deal and recover the down payment or deposit, to place a vendee's lien on the property, and specific performance. For sellers, the remedies are to sue for damages, or rescind the deal and keep the down payment or deposit, place a vendor's lien on the property, or specific performance.
The fact that a court is reluctant to order specific performance in real estate sales does not eliminate this as a remedy for both buyers and sellers - although, like you, my first reaction was that a buyer cannot be forced to purchase a home. The buyer can be forced to purchase a home, though. The law allows for this.
Here is a link to a case where the seller sued the buyer for specific performance, Kesler v. Marshall, 792 N.E.2d 893 (Ind. App. 2003), this from your home state of Indiana:
http://dirt.umkc.edu/DEC/122603.txt
In Kesler, it was because the seller failed to mitigate damages by trying to find another buyer that the court denied specific performance.
I have other cases that may be more on-point that I can provide for you (for example: Beecher v. Conradt, 13 N.Y. 108 (1855)), but not all have links so you will have to search them out on your own.
Also, the fact that the seller did not attempt to mitigate was WAY down on the list of reasons why the appeals court overturned the trial court verdict. The primary reason was that the seller did not meet his contingencies.Then, and most importantly from a precedential standpoint, the principle
opinion questioned whether specific performance ever should be
awarded as a seller's remedy. .The Court began its discussing by
recognizing that Indiana courts order specific performance for the
purchase of real estate as a matter of course because each piece of real
estate is considered unique. It noted, however, that specific performance
is an equitable remedy, which is not available as a matter of right.
Courts generally will not exercise the power of specific performance
when an adequate remedy at law exists.
Kesler does NOT prove your point. What it proves is that specific performance is a remedy available to a seller of real estate. You appear to have completely ignored what you did not bold in your quote from the case.Kesler actually proves my point.
Also, the fact that the seller did not attempt to mitigate was WAY down on the list of reasons why the appeals court overturned the trial court verdict. The primary reason was that the seller did not meet his contingencies.
I have to "yikes" right back at you...I certainly understood the full paragraph I quoted, but I am beginning to believe that you do not.Kesler does NOT prove your point. What it proves is that specific performance is a remedy available to a seller of real estate. You appear to have completely ignored what you did not bold in your quote from the case.
Yikes.
I really do not want to provide case after case for you to read and comprehend. The law allows for specific performance in real estate transactions (in most states). Period. It probably does not apply to our poster here and it is unlikely to apply to most real estate transactions, but the remedy is there. A buyer as well as a seller can be forced to live up to the terms of a contract.
Indiana has NOTHING to do with Ohio. Try again. Oh and read Ohio Caselaw.I have to "yikes" right back at you...I certainly understood the full paragraph I quoted, but I am beginning to believe that you do not.
and furthermore:The Plaintiffs-Appellees relied to their detriment upon the promise by the Defendants-Appellants that the latter would purchase their propeprty for $36,000 by March 31, 1981. As a result of that offer, Plaintiffs-Appellees gave Defendants-Appellants another opportunity to sell their property rather than seek out the services of another broker. In addition, Plaintiff-Appellee Nott purchased another home and incurred a second mortgage indebtedness relying on the fact that his home would be sold at least by March 31, 1981 and his first mortgage indebtedness would then be satisfied. Since Defendants-Appellants have not kept their promise, Plaintiffs-Appellees have been burdened with payment of loans on two houses at the same time and the parties have been deprived of the use of the "guaranteed" sales proceeds since March 31, 1981.
Even if we were to find that a new consideration was necessary to support the giving of the "guarantee" by Defendants-Appellants and that, in fact, there was no such new consideration, the trial court could still have applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel against Defendants-Appellants in order to enforce their promise. The purpose of such a rule is to enforce a promise which the promisor should expect will cause some detrimental reliance by the party to whom the promise had been directed. This doctrine of "promissory estoppel" has been applied by Ohio courts as is seen in the case of In Re First-Central Trust Co. (1944) Court of Appeals, Summit County, 75 Ohio App. 1, 60 NE 2d 503.
For all of the reasons set forth hereinabove, we find that the trial court did not err in finding that a contract to purchase the real property of Plaintiffs-Appellees Nott by Defendant-Appellant C. Russel Bunning is enforceable by specific performance and we further find that the trial court's Finding of Fact No. 6 and Conclusion of Law No. 2 are not contrary to the weight of the evidence. For such reasons, we hereby overrule Defendants-Appellants' first and second Assignments of Error.
We hold further that money damages in the form of interest are proper in addition to granting specific performance and in order to compensate in this case Plaintiffs-Appellees for Defendants-Appellants' delay in performance of the contract. The only remedy which would put Plaintiffs-Appellees in the economic position that they would have been in on March 31, 1981, had this contract been performed, is to grant monetary damages in the form of interest from the date that performance was promised to the date that it is completed. Interest is a proper measure of damages in actions involving the breach of contract to pay money as is set forth in 30 Ohio Jur. 3d, Damages, Section 99, in which the treatise writer states:
"In actions where the breach of contract consists of a failure to pay money, interest is especially recoverable as damages, because, according to the common understanding, it actually represents the value of the use of money. Thus, the consequence attached by law to the breach of an obligation to pay money is invariably the payment of interest in addition to the principal sum which fell due. The legal rate of interest by universal sanction is made the measure of damages in all cases of breach of an obligation to pay money when due. In fact, it is provided by statute that in the absence of a stipulation by the parties as to the amount of interest, when money becomes due and payable upon any bond, bill, note or other instrument of writing, upon any book account, or settlement between parties, upon all verbal contracts entered into, and upon all judgments, decrees, and orders of any judicial tribunal for the payment of money arising out of a contract, or other transaction, the creditor is entitled to interest at the rate of 8 percent per annum, and no more."
We hold that the trial court applied the correct measure of damages which should award Plaintiffs-Appellees eight percent of $36,000 from March 31, 1981 until the principal sum is paid.
For such reasons, we hereby overrule Defendants-Appellants' third Assignments of Error.
You are wrong, Ld. Just admit it. OP is in OHIO. OHIO law controls and you are completely wrong.I have to "yikes" right back at you...I certainly understood the full paragraph I quoted, but I am beginning to believe that you do not.