Just FYI
here is what Oregon has to say about civil compromise
Oregon
Judicial discourse on civil compromise in Oregon focuses on the types of crimes that are susceptible to civil compromise, the role of the parties involved, and the meaning of "satisfaction for the injury" as found in the statute. Close analysis the specific cases sheds some light on the considerations that weigh against compromise.
Only misdemeanors and class C felonies punishable as misdemeanors are amenable to civil compromise. State v. Dumond 530 P.2d 35, 33, (1974). The court requires that there be a "discrete victim or victims" in order to compromise, thereby limiting the set of compromisable offenses to private, rather than public wrongs. State v. Van Hoomissen
, 866 P.2d 521, 522, (1994).
The power to compromise rests solely with the court, however the role of the victim and the accused is not to be overlooked. Dumond 530 P.2d at 34. In all cases, the judge should not be a party to the negotiations and cannot intervene until the victim gives written acknowledgment of satisfaction. State v. ******dale, 569 P.2d 659, 661, (1977). A compromise between the accused and a minor victim must be signed by the minor victim, rather than the parents. State v. Phak, 754 P.2d 31, 32, (1988). The court may not direct the terms of the compromise or dismiss because the court believes the injured party is seeking too much. ******dale, 569 P.2d at 661. Further, the question of whether the consent of the DA's office is required remains unanswered. State v. Johnsen,, 962 P.2d 689, 692, (1988).
Payment of a civil penalty is satisfaction for the injury for the purposes of the civil compromise statutes. Johnsen, 962 P.2d at 689. Penal amounts in addition to actual damages are recoverable. State v. Binh Thi Tanh Ha 728 P.2d 932, 933, (1986). However, indigent defendants need not pay court costs as a part of a civil compromise. State v. Belles, 683 P.2d 1027, 1028 (1984).
The cases that refer to civil compromise fall into three general categories based on the type of offenses The first group is that of offenses that are readily compromised. The second is that offenses that cannot be compromised. The third group is that of offenses that are compromisable, but remain uncompromised at the discretion of the court.
The first two categories are easily delineated. Theft (Dumond
, 530 P.2d at 34), assault (******dale, 569 P.2d at 661) and reckless endangerment of another (Conduct of Roth 645 P.2d 1064, 1066, (1982)) are compromisable offenses. Whereas, Failure to leave information at the scene of an accident (State v. Duffy, 576 P.2d 797, 798, (1978)), public indecency (Van Hoomissen " 866 P.2d at 522), reckless driving (State v. DW,ger and State Bar disciplinary proceedings (Conduct of , 698 P.2d 491, 493 (1985)) Boothe, 740 P.2d 785, 791, (1987)) cannot be compromised.
The third category, as it appears in the case law, is restricted to crimes against the person. The court refused to compromise a charge of menacing when the circumstances surrounding the case revealed that the offender menaced the victim by attempting to burn her by first dousing her in rubbing alcohol. State v. Elam, 587 P.2d 491, 492-93, (1978). The court also refused to compromise a charge of assault IV (which had been compromised two years earlier in a case in which a judge slapped his estranged wife (Conduct of Roth 645 P.2d at 1066)) when the victim was only three years of age. State v. Cetto "674 P.2d 31, 32, (1988).The court refused to construe an agreement to pay $5,000 for "loss of face," from one Laotian family to another (in keeping with Laotian customs) as a civil compromise, in part because the seventeen year old victim did not sign the agreement. State v. Phak 754 P.2d at 32. Similarly, the appellate court reversed the dismissal of charges pursuant to civil compromise of a charge of sexual abuse in the first degree for the same reason, namely, that the minor victim had not signed the agreement. State v. Fitterer, 820 P.2d 841, 842 (1991). When contrasted with the flat denial of a motion (offered jointly between the accused, the victim and the victim's parents) to compromise sexual abuse in the third degree, contributing to the sexual delinquency of a minor, and furnishing alcohol to a minor, one has the sense that Phak and Fitterer could have been compromised had the procedural requirements been met. See Conduct of Wolf, 826 P.2d at 629.
The third category of cases illustrates when the court exercises discretion not to dismiss. It appears that the more violent the offense, the less likely it is that the charges will be dropped. See Elam -93. It also appears that younger, 587 P.2d at 492 victims are less likely to be allowed to settle by civil compromise. See Cetto 674 P.2d at 32. The sexual misconduct cases demonstrate an unwillingness on the part of the court to compromise cases that involve sexual misconduct with minor victims. However, only in one such case does the court flatly refuse to compromise an offense involving attorney misconduct with a minor client, pointing to procedural defects preventing the compromise of other, similar cases. See Fitterer, 820 P.2d at 842; Phak, 754 P.2d at 32; and Wolf, 826 P.2d at 629.
http://www.mcadlaw.com/civ__compromise_file.htm
here is what Oregon has to say about civil compromise
Oregon
Judicial discourse on civil compromise in Oregon focuses on the types of crimes that are susceptible to civil compromise, the role of the parties involved, and the meaning of "satisfaction for the injury" as found in the statute. Close analysis the specific cases sheds some light on the considerations that weigh against compromise.
Only misdemeanors and class C felonies punishable as misdemeanors are amenable to civil compromise. State v. Dumond 530 P.2d 35, 33, (1974). The court requires that there be a "discrete victim or victims" in order to compromise, thereby limiting the set of compromisable offenses to private, rather than public wrongs. State v. Van Hoomissen
, 866 P.2d 521, 522, (1994).
The power to compromise rests solely with the court, however the role of the victim and the accused is not to be overlooked. Dumond 530 P.2d at 34. In all cases, the judge should not be a party to the negotiations and cannot intervene until the victim gives written acknowledgment of satisfaction. State v. ******dale, 569 P.2d 659, 661, (1977). A compromise between the accused and a minor victim must be signed by the minor victim, rather than the parents. State v. Phak, 754 P.2d 31, 32, (1988). The court may not direct the terms of the compromise or dismiss because the court believes the injured party is seeking too much. ******dale, 569 P.2d at 661. Further, the question of whether the consent of the DA's office is required remains unanswered. State v. Johnsen,, 962 P.2d 689, 692, (1988).
Payment of a civil penalty is satisfaction for the injury for the purposes of the civil compromise statutes. Johnsen, 962 P.2d at 689. Penal amounts in addition to actual damages are recoverable. State v. Binh Thi Tanh Ha 728 P.2d 932, 933, (1986). However, indigent defendants need not pay court costs as a part of a civil compromise. State v. Belles, 683 P.2d 1027, 1028 (1984).
The cases that refer to civil compromise fall into three general categories based on the type of offenses The first group is that of offenses that are readily compromised. The second is that offenses that cannot be compromised. The third group is that of offenses that are compromisable, but remain uncompromised at the discretion of the court.
The first two categories are easily delineated. Theft (Dumond
, 530 P.2d at 34), assault (******dale, 569 P.2d at 661) and reckless endangerment of another (Conduct of Roth 645 P.2d 1064, 1066, (1982)) are compromisable offenses. Whereas, Failure to leave information at the scene of an accident (State v. Duffy, 576 P.2d 797, 798, (1978)), public indecency (Van Hoomissen " 866 P.2d at 522), reckless driving (State v. DW,ger and State Bar disciplinary proceedings (Conduct of , 698 P.2d 491, 493 (1985)) Boothe, 740 P.2d 785, 791, (1987)) cannot be compromised.
The third category, as it appears in the case law, is restricted to crimes against the person. The court refused to compromise a charge of menacing when the circumstances surrounding the case revealed that the offender menaced the victim by attempting to burn her by first dousing her in rubbing alcohol. State v. Elam, 587 P.2d 491, 492-93, (1978). The court also refused to compromise a charge of assault IV (which had been compromised two years earlier in a case in which a judge slapped his estranged wife (Conduct of Roth 645 P.2d at 1066)) when the victim was only three years of age. State v. Cetto "674 P.2d 31, 32, (1988).The court refused to construe an agreement to pay $5,000 for "loss of face," from one Laotian family to another (in keeping with Laotian customs) as a civil compromise, in part because the seventeen year old victim did not sign the agreement. State v. Phak 754 P.2d at 32. Similarly, the appellate court reversed the dismissal of charges pursuant to civil compromise of a charge of sexual abuse in the first degree for the same reason, namely, that the minor victim had not signed the agreement. State v. Fitterer, 820 P.2d 841, 842 (1991). When contrasted with the flat denial of a motion (offered jointly between the accused, the victim and the victim's parents) to compromise sexual abuse in the third degree, contributing to the sexual delinquency of a minor, and furnishing alcohol to a minor, one has the sense that Phak and Fitterer could have been compromised had the procedural requirements been met. See Conduct of Wolf, 826 P.2d at 629.
The third category of cases illustrates when the court exercises discretion not to dismiss. It appears that the more violent the offense, the less likely it is that the charges will be dropped. See Elam -93. It also appears that younger, 587 P.2d at 492 victims are less likely to be allowed to settle by civil compromise. See Cetto 674 P.2d at 32. The sexual misconduct cases demonstrate an unwillingness on the part of the court to compromise cases that involve sexual misconduct with minor victims. However, only in one such case does the court flatly refuse to compromise an offense involving attorney misconduct with a minor client, pointing to procedural defects preventing the compromise of other, similar cases. See Fitterer, 820 P.2d at 842; Phak, 754 P.2d at 32; and Wolf, 826 P.2d at 629.
http://www.mcadlaw.com/civ__compromise_file.htm
